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ABSTRACT 
Nietzsche and Asian Philosophy : A Comparative Study M.A. 1994 
By Douglas Richard Thomas 
This thesis closely examined the similarities and differences between Friedrich 
Nietzsche and Asian Philosophy. Surprising as this may be, Nietzsche and Asian 
philosophy share many common philosophical patterns. By examining Nietzsche's main 
points of his philosophical discourse; such as "Will to Power", "Eternal Occurrence", and 
the "Ubermensch" ideal, whilst comparing these concepts to Hindu, Buddhist and Taoism 
concepts; we wil l find that there are, as well, often contrasting and conflicting definitive 
conclusions between Nietzsche and the "East". 
Nevertheless, certain similarities such as the concepts of the Hindu Caste system, 
the Buddhist notion of the "non-self and the role of language in their religion, and the 
Taoist role of nature, to name a few examples, make this study a useful and viable one in 
comparing Nietzsche to these notions. 
Yet, one cannot assume that the many parallels found between Nietzsche and Asian 
thought are a result of Eastern influence upon Nietzsche's thinking. The purpose of this 
study is not to discover whether Nietzsche knew an appreciable amount of Asian 
philosophy - in fact this thesis is based upon the understanding that Nietzsche reached his 
philosophical conclusions independent of Asian influence. We wil l , however, notice that 
Nietzsche used several Asian concepts as models and metaphors in promoting his ideas in 
an effort to break through and sweep away the social and religious institutions of his time. 
This study wil l also enhance our understanding of Nietzsche, the man, whom is 
often misconstrued as something other than what he was. In gaining an understanding of 
our place in the world, sometimes it is important to attempt to comprehend even seemingly 
opposing opinions. For Nietzsche, in his effort to break out of the traditional "Western" 
world, such an effort was a necessity. Hence, one understands the importance in 
contemplating the parallels and patterns, and contrasts and contradictions of Nietzschean 
and Asian philosophy. 
Nietzsche and Asian Philosophy 
A Comparative Study 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without 
J his prior written consent and information derived 
from it should be acknowledged. 
Douglas Richard Thomas 
For the qualification of : 
M.A. 
At : 
The University of Durham 
Department of Philosophy 
1994 
1 4 FEB 1995 
STATEMENT OF COPYRIGHT 
"This copy has been supplied for the purpose of research or private 
study on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no 
quotation from the thesis may be published without prior 
acknowledgement." 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I am greatly indebted to my supervisor, Professor D.E. Cooper, for his help and 
support during this research. I would also like to thank my wife Jane, my mother, 
father and sister for their tremendous help and encouragement. Also, thanks to 
Andrew High for persuading me that this thesis was conceivable. Lastly, many 
thanks to Sharon Swainston for her patience in typing this dissertation. 
T A B L E OF CONTENTS 
Page No. 
Introduction 2-5 
Chapter 1 : The Hierarchical Nature of 
Nietzsche and Indian Religion 
6-21 
Chapter 2 : Nihilistic and Ascetic Aspects 22-36 
Chapter 3 : "A Sense of the Earth" 37-53 
Chapter 4 : "Caves Within Caves" 
The Role of Language in 
Nagariuna's and Nietzsche's 
Philosophy 
54-84 
Chapter 5 : "Poets of our Lives" 85 -106 
Conclusions 107-110 
Bibliography 111-116 
INTRODUCTION 
Surprisingly, Nietzsche and Asian philosophy share many similar 
philosophical notions. Both are also often misunderstood and misrepresented within 
Western culture. With Nietzsche this is especially true, in that his philosophy is 
generally considered to be elitist without reason, and nihilistic to a fault. Yet, as 
we shall see in this thesis, Nietzsche optimistically asks every man to seek to raise 
himself, in the conduct and understanding of his life, to become in truth a "poet of 
his l ife". 
This thesis will closely examine the many similarities between Nietzsche and 
Asian concepts. At times it would appear that Nietzsche was influenced by 
Schopenhauer, and his study of Asian philosophy; yet we wil l find, as always in 
studying Nietzsche, many contradictions. In fact, several important Asian notions, 
which are for the Western reader negative in their view of existence, are entirely 
refuted by the call of Nietzsche's basic tenet for man to grasp his "will to power", 
in the conduct of his life. 
In this thesis, we will examine both the similar, and contrasting concepts to 
be found within Nietzschean and Asian philosophy. The questions which are asked, 
often result with conflicting answers, between the two philosophies, and yet we will 
find a strong pattern of similarity, in what Nietzsche was trying to establish in his 
philosophical concepts, and the models of Eastern thought found within Hindu 
(caste system), Buddhist (non-self, role of language), and Taoist (role of nature) 
precepts. Yet, we cannot assume that the many parallels found between Nietzsche, 
and Asian thought are a result of Eastern influence upon Nietzsche's thinking. The 
purpose of this study is not to discover whether Nietzsche knew an appreciable 
amount of Asian philosophy, in fact this thesis is based upon the understanding that 
Nietzsche reached his philosophical conclusions independent of Asian influence. 
We wi l l , however, see that Nietzsche used several Asian concepts, as models and 
metaphors in promoting his concepts, in his effort to break through and sweep away 
the social and religious institutions of his time. It was Nietzsche's intention to 
dispose of Western culture and religion to enable man to reach his ful l potential. 
This thesis wil l give close examination to several Asian philosophical 
concepts, which are used as models in Nietzschean concepts. These include the 
Hindu Caste system, the several schools of Buddhism, including Madhyamaka 
Buddhism and the influence of Taoism and Ch'an or Zen. In the first chapter we 
wi l l investigate the relationship between the Hindu Caste system, and Nietzsche's so 
called "aristocratic" concepts. It is within these parallels in which we encounter 
such terms as "herd morality", and ideas suggesting that each man is "better o f f 
living within his "Caste", or position in life. This, of course, has been one of the 
Nietzschean concepts that have been associated with negative connotations by his 
critics. This chapter will attempt to clarify this negativism through a review of the 
meaning of the caste system in Indian culture, and its use as a model in Nietzschean 
philosophy. Here we wil l be introduced to Nietzsche's concepts of Ubermensch, 
Eternal Recurrence, and Wil l to Power, and will see that Nietzsche is dutiful to 
mankind's advancement toward a truer self. With the Ubermensch as the goal, 
Nietzsche wants man to live more faithfully to his instincts. The chapter will 
question i f this is to be considered an aristocratic idea. Like the Hindu caste 
system, Nietzsche does stress that it is part of man's nature to live within a 
hierarchical structure. 
Chapter two, wil l explore Indian asceticism, reviewing both Hindu and 
Buddhist views on this subject, which Nietzsche uses as examples in clarifying his 
arguments foi- a "new beginning" in philosophical thought. Indeed, ascetism is used 
as a mirror for Nietzsche. This chapter will discuss Nietzsche's dissociation with 
Schopenhauer's nihilism, and the thinking of the Russian nihilists of the 1850s and 
60s. Nevertheless, Nietzsche uses both Indian ascetism and nihilism, as stepping 
stones in the advancement for a newer philosophy. A comparison wil l be made 
between Nietzsche's "Will to Power" and the Indian ascetic model of "Tapas". We 
will also explore how Nietzsche uses, as a tool, the Buddhist model of philosophy in 
his attack on Christianity, and his opposition to the dualities of Good and Evil. 
Chapter three is devoted to the subject of the "self" and the "non-self within 
Nietzschean and Buddhist philosophies. We will find strong similarities between 
Nietzsche's concept of self (soul, ego) and Buddhist concepts. Calling for a 
recovery of the "sense of the earth", Nietzsche is shown to favour the Buddhist 
concept of mind-body as one, as opposed to a Westernized separation of the two, 
into Body aM. Soul. For both Nietzsche and Buddhism, the body is instinctively 
closer to nature. This chapter also gives a background of the basic Buddhist 
philosophical concepts and religious practices. Examples from Zen Buddhism are 
shown to highlight Nietzsche's similarities with Buddhist philosophy. 
Chapter Four explores in detail the role of language in Nietzsche's 
philosophy, and that of Nagarjuna, as well as the Madhyamaka sect in Buddhism. 
This wil l study the similarities of thought found in Nagarjuna's and Nietzsche's 
philosophical view of language, as a barrier to understanding the reality of 
existence. This chapter is important in also studying the beginning of the Mahayana 
movement within Buddhism, and its spreading to the Far East, as well as 
confirming the "non-duality" comparisons between Buddhist and Nietzschean 
philosophy; both state that language misrepresents us, and leads us to believe in a 
world as object and entity. The chapter shows how Nietzsche is contiguous to 
Buddhist thought in believing that one has to break down the "metaphysical truths" 
in order for mankind to mature and grow. Although it is primarily intended for 
comparison with Nietzsche, this background information is necessary for the 
Nietzschean scholar to understand the basics of Buddhist philosophy and religion 
(i.e. Prajnaparamita literature, the Dharmas, Sunyata, Nirvana, Anatman). This 
chapter also introduces the reader, albeit briefly, to Wittgenstein, and his views on 
the role of language. 
The final chapter, introduces the rather capricious world of Zen and Zen art, 
compared to Nietzsche's use of art as a metaphor, and example for his tJbermensch 
ideal. This somewhat strange marriage of ideas comes to coagulate in the notion 
that nature to both Zen and Nietzsche is of great importance, and that it is art. 
which can bring the "nature out of man". The chapter highlights all forms of Zen 
art, from painting to archery. Through art both Zen and Nietzschean philosophy 
strive for a return to "naivety" and "instinct". We wil l also follow the transition 
from traditional Buddhism to Zen and examine Taoism, which is important in its 
views on nature in comparison with Nietzsche's concepts. From Taoism to Zen, 
and Zen to Nietzsche, we shall see how closely these different, yet in many ways 
similar philosophies share certain ideas on how man should live his life. 
Note : The use of any Pali or Sanskrit accents wil l not be used in this thesis, 
except for any ambiguities which may occur. 
D. R. Thomas 
CHAPTER ONE 
The Hierarchical Nature of Nietzsche and Indian Religion 
This chapter wil l examine the validity of allegations, which claim that the 
Caste system in India, and Nietzschean philosophy are aristocratic and elitist. 
In many of his works, we find that Nietzsche makes frequent positive 
references to Brahminical concepts. We must ask ourselves, why this is so, and in 
what context does he use these concepts? This question wil l inevitably lead us to a 
broader discussion concerning moralism. It is the intention of this chapter to 
introduce Nietzsche, who is strongly known as the instigator in the anti-moralist 
tradition, and whose philosophical thought leads us beyond conventional concepts of 
morality, beyond "good and evil" to, he alleges, a greater intellectual appreciation 
of man's worth. 
In this investigation it is important that we dissociate our thinking from 
currently popular "politically correct" ideals, in comparing the Caste system to 
Nietzsche's aristocratism. However, shocking and painful it may be to read about 
such "atrocities" of the human condition, we must also understand why the Caste 
system was used as a model in Nietzsche's works. Here the word "model" is used 
most appropriately, for it is important for the reader to understand that Nietzsche 
used these concepts metaphorically, and not in the literal sense. We must also 
understand Nietzsche's dissociation from the "democratic" world, the world of the 
industrialization of Europe, and the Christian work ethic, which indeed created its 
own system of caste in many respects. 
This is not to say that Nietzsche's call for a feudal renaissance is not 
alarming and disturbing, as is the Brahminical system for the Western reader. Let 
us examine these concepts in a theoretical sense looking toward the Nietzschean 
ideal of a successful society without the need of an organized church. 
" after all, some men are more suited to design churches than to preach 
in them: the best system is that which, each man doing his 'thing', each 
man can fu l f i l himself and society can attain its end simultaneously and 
harmoniously" (A. Danto, Mysticism and Morality. p41). 
The intention of this chapter is to examine the relationship of Nietzschean 
thought and the Indian Caste system, and is not a thorough study of the meaning 
and effect of Caste within Indian society. The Caste system in India shall be 
explored from the perspective of the influence it had upon Nietzsche's works, and 
the relevant importance of this influence in Nietzsche's philosophy being 
categorised as immoral. 
When we encounter such words as "herd morality" and "overman" within 
Nietzsche's writings, we may think of these words as anticipating the principles of 
the Third Reich. This is an improper interpretation, which such writers as 
Kaufmann, Schacht and Danto have attempted to rectify. What we do find in 
Nietzsche's writings, however, are concepts of social progress within society, which 
have elitist and selfish overtones and lead to this fascist image. When reading 
Nietzsche there is a need to approach his philosophy "holistically", and in doing so 
one understands his ideas, and ideals such as the "herd" and "overman" in a new 
context. So, too, we must view Nietzsche's thoughts on Caste with this same 
holistic approach. The Brahminical concepts, as previously mentioned, greatly 
interested Nietzsche. The reason for this seems quite clear when we get to know 
more about the man and his philosophical thoughts concerning Caste. 
The ideals of Caste highlight and illustrate a system that is meant to serve a 
higher class, a higher breed of people. For Nietzsche, his interest in this system has 
to do with the system itself, rather than the participants. Nietzsche would not have 
thought twice about discarding the idea that the Brahmins were the only class of 
people who could attain his "Ubermensch" ideal (as we will see later in this 
chapter). 
For the present let us describe Nietzsche's concept as follows: Nietzsche's 
idea is that mankind can transform itself to a higher level of living, i f man 
understands the role which he plays in the life process. Much like a pyramid there 
have to be more stones on the bottom, before higher stones, and inevitably the 
highest stones can ascend to the peak. The Caste system in India, and its 
hierarchical development ensures that the "highest" remain the highest order, and 
that those in the lower order, unable to elevate themselves, have only the duty to 
serve the highest Caste, without hope of achieving any goals outside of one's Caste. 
What interests Nietzsche about this concept is that it enables us to think in terms of 
a hierarchical model for mankind. Man's natural state, according to Nietzsche, is 
to employ such a system, to achieve "cultural" improvement, bringing man back 
into Nature and its surroundings, and discarding the unnatural moral "anchor" of 
the Church. Yet, what are the sociological implications for India with the Caste 
system intact? Why must we disassociate the system from Nietzsche's view? 
For a brief description of the concept of Caste in India we will start with the 
four basic groups of people, which comprise the system [Note: the four basic 
groups do not include the "untouchables"/"chandalas" or "outcastes"), as they are 
seen as unworthy of placement in any group]. 
In first rank are the Brahmins, a group which consists of philosophers, 
artists, religious leaders, teachers, etc., who are the modem version of what was a 
priestly caste in the past. Of the second rank are the administrators, those who 
organize, and supervise the lower castes. This group was originally the warrior 
caste. Third are the producers, the craftsmen, artisans, farmers, etc., who were 
originally the trader/agriculture caste. Following are the servant class (follower 
caste), which now includes unskilled labour, and are traditionally considered 
incapable of leading. 
Without entering into a sociological debate not relevant to this study, the 
problem many of us find with this arrangement is the total lack of mobility within 
the system. Once bom into a certain group one stays within it. We could argue 
that this cannot be justified. We could also argue that it gives purpose, and 
meaning to Hindu life, which may be unconcerned with benefitting from this 
material life, as we know it. One can also say that post-Gandhian reform has 
helped to banish the "Chandala" label, and that India is moving into a democratic. 
Westernized society, although such reform is not readily accepted, when set against 
many years of tradition. As Houston Smith states: "We with our democratic 
sentiments do not like to admit that there are such people by Nature. The orthodox 
Hindu replies, what you would like people to be is not the point. The question is 
what they are" (H. Smith, Religions of Man. p70). Metaphorically this is where 
Nietzsche comes into the picture, for he saw that man cannot live without a 
distinctive hierarchy and in denying this condition he is lying to himself and his 
breed (i.e. Mankind). 
Nietzsche's hierarchical stance is for the benefit of the human race, and not 
for the Aryan, the German, "the Blue-eyed Beast", and certainly not for the 
Protestant Christian alone. Although Smith's quote has some definite undertones of 
negativity, there is also an underlying positiveness in the fact that man must take a 
step towards his nature and observe its laws. Man must understand his sense of 
duty, and accept his fate and place in the order. 
Let us explain what Nietzsche means by Ws hierarchy. Again, the structure 
of the hierarchical Caste system is appealing to Nietzsche not for its contents, but as 
a model. Later his thoughts on Indian religion changed toward being rather hostile 
once he disassociated himself from Schopenhauer. Nevertheless the Caste model, 
as with the Greek Polls system model remained important for Nietzsche, because he 
saw within those systems the means for Man to benefit himself and his true Nature. 
The laws of Manu within Brahminism offered Nietzsche a subject with 
which to break from his Christian past. The laws of Manu, given by Manu, the 
first man, who as the survivor of the great flood became the patriarch of the human 
race, envisioned the four basic groups we know as Castes. The laws of Manu 
offered a strong contrast with social systems in Nietzsche's Europe, where a large, 
diffuse middle-class was coming increasingly to dominate an industrial society. 
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One might suggest that Nietzsche is "throwing down the gauntlet" with his strong 
statements which seem to lead from the pages of his works. Nietzsche's style is to 
attack, the stronger the analogy the better, as we see in Twilight of the Idols, "how 
wretched is the New Testament compared to Manu, how foul it smells!" (F. 
Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols in Kaufmann (Ed.), The Portable Nietzsche. p503). 
Such an intense statement only highlights Nietzsche's urgent appeal for change. 
Not a change toward Hindu beliefs, but rather a change from the excesses burdening 
mankind, during the Industrial Revolution. 
Nietzsche's understanding of the Caste system, and of anything Indian, 
stems largely from his association with Schopenhauer. As Nietzsche's philosophy 
changed over his relatively brief lifespan, so too does his view of the Indian system 
and its "pessimistic" outlook. This is surely the reason for Nietzsche rejecting 
aspects of Hindu religion other than its endorsement of the Caste system. This is 
rather unfortunate in many respects, for there is much in Nietzsche's philosophical 
thought, which seems closely linked in many respects to the East. Nietzsche's 
acceptance of the Caste system is a revolt against the Westem model of democracy 
and his own Christian roots. 
Later in this thesis we will discuss the ways in which Nietzsche's philosophy 
compares to the Eastern tradition, but for the moment it is important to review 
Nietzsche's thinking on Caste alone, for it opens up many points for discussion. 
I f we accept, for the time being, that Nietzsche's revolt against the West is 
exemplified through Brahminism, is it also true that Nietzsche believed that the 
unequal status between Castes is a necessity for life to function properly? As 
Nietzsche states in Beyond Good and Evil, the Indians, "as among the Greeks, 
Persians and Moslems", are correct in believing in the order of rank and, "not 
equality and equal rights" (F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. 30). This 
statement reflects his thoughts that systems of equality do not benefit the progress of 
Man. Christianity is considered a "chandala" religion by Nietzsche, while examples 
of religions and cultures which favour the privileged classes, such as Brahminism 
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and the Greek Polls system are favoured. Although Nietzsche is known as a 
philosopher, who supports the concept of individuality and personal freedom from 
within, he does not seem to have been concerned about the plight of the individual 
when his writing is given a surface interpretation. Nietzsche is concerned about the 
individual, but not for one who relinquishes his personal freedom to any deity. 
Such belief jeopardizes our need to flourish from a higher form of existence, in the 
here and now. What Nietzsche is concerned with above all is that our society 
should try to envision an "overman", a superman, in order for us to evolve into a 
"higher" being. This according to Nietzsche should be the primary reason for 
living, and i f it is necessary to sacrifice oneself to "slavery", this is spiritual 
submission, not physical. 
When Nietzsche calls for a revolution against the democratic state, it is a call 
for a revolution of the spirit, and of the way in which one thinks about human 
existence. In this world not many people will be able to fully achieve this higher 
state of being - only the few wil l have the privilege of being evolved beings. As 
previously stated, Nietzsche did find the Caste system, and its subdivisions an 
attractive alternative to "modern society". Nietzsche's thinking developed in a time 
when man was sensing a change towards an individual identity, a change toward the 
way in which one feels about oneself, in terms of class and hierarchy. As L . 
Dumont states, "In modern society the human being is regarded as the 
indivisible, elementary man, both a biological being and a thinking subject. Each 
particular man in a sense incarnates the whole of mankind" (L. Dumont, Homo 
Hierarchicus. p44). 
This so-called "change", stemming from the industrial revolution, and based 
on a Calvinistic work ethic was not the change that Nietzsche admired. Indeed he 
was opposed to this concept, for he saw it as weakening the human race due to the 
imbalance resulting from the absence of a hierarchical system. Nietzsche 
understood this change to be a revolt of the herd, brought forth by Christianity, 
which cherished the chandala and became strong by promising salvation to the 
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masses, and through the industrial revolution. 
Nietzsche's hope was for this new "culture" to reverse its direction away 
from those moral trappings, and to bring it back to its more natural beginnings. As 
Warren states : "Nietzsche thought that any new culture would and should function 
for the "herd" as ideology, while serving to individuate and express the powers of 
the few "higher" types. In this model, culture would be a means of subordinating 
the "herd" to a dominant class of culturally superior "individuals" (M. Warren, 
Nietzsche and Political Thought. p67). Hence, we see that Nietzsche's 
understanding of a hierarchical structure is based on an assumption that those who 
are the cultural elite should rule the herd, for the herd need to be mled anyway. 
Inevitably the "herd" will find the means to classify themselves in different 
ways. I f it is not the laws of Manu, then it is the class system in Britain, for one 
example. Certainly once the "polish" has rubbed off the Industrial Revolution as it 
has now, we find that many societies continue to live in a "feudal" tradition. 
Although today in the Westem world, the middle class does have an opportunity to 
better itself, by climbing the social scale through work, sound financial judgement 
and good fortune, we are by no means free from distinctions of social and class 
superiority. As Dumont writes : "the difference of nature and status between 
communities is sometimes reasserted in a disastrous way : it is then conceived as 
proceeding from somatic characteristics - which is racism" (L. Dumont, op. cit., 
p51). 
Indeed current societies, as products of the Industrial Revolution, have 
created new avenues in which our hierarchical nature can survive. Why is this so? 
I f one were to ask Nietzsche, the answer would be that it is our nature to act in this 
way. The concept of equality is an unnatural concept for mankind to achieve. It is 
an unnatural phenomenon fuelled by a moralistic society. As much as equality is an 
unnatural concept, so too is morality. For Nietzsche morality is a concept, which 
impedes man's development. 
The concept of morality, as a means to an end, was discarded by Nietzsche 
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as being useless for society. Nietzsche would have agreed that "most of what man 
understood as moral and metaphysical problems are in fact not problems at all, but 
merely consequences of confused and self serving manners of thinking" (T. Strong, 
Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration. p81). Morality according to 
Nietzsche was a "necessary lie", an Apollonian concept that helps us separate 
ourselves from the "beasts", the other creatures of this world. When Nietzsche 
goes "beyond good and evil", he is effectively tearing down the very foundations of 
morality, which as he sees it, that which feeds upon fear of the unknown and of the 
possibility that our lives are void of meaning. I f man is to be free to choose his 
own actions and also to be free to choose his development and destiny, then moral 
thinking must be rejected. Nietzsche in this sense is the philosopher of 
individuality, responsibility and equality. I f so, how can he also be the philosopher 
who supports power and mastery over people? Can Nietzsche be interpreted as 
supporting either concept depending upon the judgement of the reader? 
The labels of elitism and Aristocratism can be applied to Nietzsche in the 
sense of their cultural and intellectual importance, and not in terms of their social 
significance. His call for a feudal restoration and the creation of a nobility should 
be seen in psychological and phenomenological terms; a way of envisioning reform, 
totally unlike any sort of social reform (e.g. Caste system). 
It is often stated by Western scholars, that morality is not of major concern 
within Indian tradition, as it is in the Judeao/Christian tradition. Obviously, this is 
an idea which would be interesting to Nietzsche, especially during the period when 
he was attracted to Schopenhauer's works. Nevertheless, one comes to understand 
Nietzsche's dissociation from Eastern religions, and Schopenhauarian pessimism in 
his later writings, which we shall examine later on in this thesis. 
The world for the Hindu, the world as we know it , is a world that is 
Samsara; attached to the cycle of rebirth, escape from which is the primary concern 
of Hinduism. This, of course, helps us to understand the background, and total 
acceptance of the Caste system in India, for it is assumed that although one is bom 
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into a caste, this is only a passing, inessential condition. This life is not considered 
to be of primary importance. Such thinking would suggest that India and Indian 
religions do not aspire to a moralistic and ethical society. This is not true and an 
understanding of the Caste system will clarify this matter. 
Caste is a system of subdivisions (Castes or Jati) and "further complicates 
the class functions, gradually turning them into a discriminatory institution based on 
birth. The Brahmins profit most from the system and they hold the power-base. A 
life-affirming, but rigidly authoritarian morality develops" (P. Bilimoria, "Indian 
Ethics" in P. Singer (Ed.), A Companion to Ethics. p43). This has lead many 
scholars to believe that the ethical view of India is an irrational one (for example 
Max Weber). Yet in studying the Vedas in the Brahmin tradition we find that they 
are indeed concerned with moral ideals such as truthfulness, duty and giving (satya, 
dharma and dana). 
Let us take Dharma, as an example. Dharma, usually translated in the West 
as duty or law, has several meanings within the Vedas such as duty, right, justice, 
morality, virtue, etc. (P. Singer (Ed.), op. cit., p46). "It certainly connotes the 
idea of that which maintains, gives order and cohesion to any given reality, and 
ultimately to nature, society and the individual" (P. Singer (Ed.), Loc. cit., p46). 
As Purosottama Bilimoria claims in The Great Ethical Traditions. Dharma takes on 
a human dimension of morality, much like Hegel's idea of "Sittlichkeit", the actual 
ethical order that regulates the conduct of the individual, family, civil life, and 
state" (P. Singer (Ed.), Loc. cit., p46). This is not to say that Dharma suggests 
anything other than a "form of life" to the Hindu, "whose sanction lies beyond 
individual, and even group, or collective preferences" (P. Singer (Ed.), Loc. cit., 
p46). Dharma is the law, and the law changes to meet the requirements for each 
caste, and its moral regulation. It is evident that dharma plays a role, as an 
important and cohesive part of the Hindu social system. Dharma is a "frame, for 
what is ethically proper or desirable at any one time" (P. Singer (Ed.), Loc. cit., 
p46). 
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Within this moral frame of Dharma the Hindu accepts his status in life, 
knowing that i f he is bom within a low caste, he will remain in this low caste. 
What gives the Hindu hope? Why bother with acting "correctly", when there is no 
hope for betterment in life? There is the notion of Karma, which instills this desire 
for betterment. Both Karma and Dharma link and consequently bring forth a model 
in which a Caste system can be ethically accepted within the Indian tradition. 
According to the doctrine of Karma, "every conscious and volitional action an 
individual engages in generates conditions for more than the visible effect, such that 
the net effect of an action 'X ' may manifest itself at a later time, or perhaps its 
traces remain in the 'unconscious' and get distributed over another time" (P. Singer 
(Ed.), Loc. cit., p46). It follows that there are "no accidents of births determining 
social iniquities; nobility within one lifetime is excluded: one has one's dharma, 
both as an endowment and as social role" (Creel, Dharma and Justice. p4). The 
Hindu must aim for a higher rebirth by living in the correct way, and not to 
complain about his lot in life (unless of course, he is ready to step off "Samsara", 
and is finally liberated, (moksha). The four pursuits in life for the Hindu are Artha 
(material interests), Kama (pleasure), Dharma (social duties and individual duties) 
and Moksha (liberation)). It is often stated that Dharma is the key in connection 
with moksha. 
When comparing Nietzsche's philosophy to Indian ethics, and morality, one 
should be familiar with the Bhagavad Gita. The Gita's ethics of concem in making 
this comparison are those that proclaim that "one must do one's duty according to 
one's nature" (P. Singer (Ed.), op. cit.., p50). The extraordinary similarity to 
Nietzsche is seen in the fact that the duty which is concemed in this statement 
depends on one's class or caste. In other words, "better one's duty though 
imperfect, than another's well-performed" (P. Singer (Ed.), Loc. cit., p50). This 
corresponds to Nietzsche's call for man to accept his fate for the future building and 
breeding of the Superman. It is better to live within the herd and to assist in 
producing the Ubermensch ideal, than to live in the herd and think that you are 
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capable of living out of your nature, and living in a world that chains us to concepts 
of good and evil. 
In examining the Bhagavad Gita model of an ethical person we encounter 
several concepts similar to Nietzsche's for example : "In Krishna's words : without 
hatred of any creature, friendly, and compassionate without possessiveness and self-
pride, equable in happiness and unhappiness ... who is dependent on nothing, 
disinterested, unworried ... and who neither hates not rejoices, does not mourn or 
hanker, and relinquishes both good and evil" (12-13-17) (P. Singer (Ed.), Loc. cit., 
p50). 
Perhaps Nietzsche was attracted to this concept through his reading of 
Schopenhauer's account of Hinduism. This is only an assumption, but there seems 
to be a remarkable similarity between Nietzsche's thinking on morality and certain 
Eastern concepts. Certainly the concept of morality is quite different in Indian and 
Nietzschean thought, when compared to Christian morality. Nevertheless they both 
have a strong commitment to duty and a requirement to strive to "do the right 
thing". And yet as observed through concepts of Christian moral thinking, both 
Indian and Nietzschean thought are considered to contain strong unethical aspects. 
Nietzsche's duty is to mankind's advancement toward a truer self. This is 
where he is seen as an individualist. He is for the man, who rises out of the ashes 
of the Industrial Revolution, and who forges a new path. For Nietzsche the label of 
elitism wil l continue to apply, and rightly so. His statements advocating the 
division of the strong from the herd, the concept of a higher man from the slave, 
has made many enemies for this philosopher. It is difficult for Western society to 
accept this ideal of the "overman", as an adequate ideal of individuality, when only 
a few can successfully reach the ideal. 
Nietzsche insists that we must value all that is human, and that "value" lies 
within the concept of the "Ubermensch", as being the goal. This means that we 
must make sacrifices, in reaching our true capabilities. Not all of us will reach the 
goal with the "baton of true wisdom" in our hands; most of us must pass it on to the 
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"Ubermensch". In this way we reflect the Hindu, few of whom achieve Moksha in 
their lifetime, and yet through correct, dutiful living, they know that they will be 
nearer the goal in future lives. 
Nietzsche also may be calling on man to live more dutifully toward his own 
species. Is this an aristocratic idea? Returning to the original question posed at the 
beginning of this chapter as to Nietzsche's moral model being based on a 
Brahminical ideal, we conclude that the answer is yes, to a certain extent. 
Culturally this is so for Nietzsche, but in the case of dividing the world into race or 
class for example, he cannot be labelled as elitist or Brahminical in this sense. 
Unfortunately, the Nazis adopted similar language to Nietzsche's (and of 
course, adopted him as their philosopher). One example, is the concept of breeding 
selected individuals to obtain an evolutional "pedigree". Yet in Nietzsche's thinking 
these so called "supermen", would not be bred to rule the weak, but for attaining 
the distinction of being the most that we can be for the good of all man and 
mankind, natural in his world, instinctual to his surroundings. 
This is in contrast to the Hindu Caste system, where it is excepted that the 
"highest" (from birth) reap the rewards of being a privileged class. No such system 
is found in-Nietzsche's work. According to D. E. Cooper, "Nietzsche's 'overman' 
would not form a 'group' at all, let alone enjoying 'privileges' and 'benefits' of any 
social kind - wealth, status, political power, 'perks' special protection, or whatever. 
Nietzsche's 'aristocracy' is one of spirit, not of land or industry; not part of the 
'rotted ruling classes' " (D. E. Cooper, Authenticity and Learning, p i 19). 
Nietzsche's philosophical and political thought is illuminated by a form of 
aristocracy that should not be mistaken, as a call for another Reich, or feudalistic 
rule. His "aristocracy of the spirit", or as Warren states his "cultural aristocracy" 
(see Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought), stems from the inspiration 
throughout his work, provided by the Greek Polis, the Italian Renaissance, 
European Feudalism, and the Indian Caste system. For Nietzsche's "cultural 
aristocratic" revolution, the herd as a subsidiary role player for the "Ubermensch" is 
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as important, as the "Ubermensch" concept itself, much as slaves and serfs were for 
the Greeks and the feudal kings. The difference lies within the question, as to why 
Nietzsche wanted this division, in the first place. For Nietzsche the separation from 
the herd is a step or an "aesthetic leap", away from the norm of the industrial 
bourgeoisie. As Warren suggests : "Nietzsche claims that the political condition for 
any great culture is a reduction of the mass of humanity to "instruments" so they 
might serve as scaffolding for a few "noble" producers of culture to elevate 
themselves" (M. Warren, op. cit., p69). 
Although Nietzsche would not care for this comparison, it held true for the 
Christian layman builder, who in working on the construction of a great cathedral, 
which he would never see completed, believed that he worked toward the creation 
of something worthy of God's love. He worked without remorse, because he 
believed that what he was doing was done for the sake of his religion. He will be 
remembered through his creation, which may last for centuries. The difference for 
Nietzsche lies in the purpose of the activity; does man build for himself or for God? 
As we have not reached a Nietzschean ideal such as the Ubermensch ideal 
(and because these notions lie within a hypothetical structure) maybe it is easier for 
us to hypothetically lay down and make way for those who are more intelligent, 
more in tune with nature and more able to handle true "humanness" and get on with 
accepting our fate as being inferior for the sake of mankind. One can only wonder 
at the amount of chaos this might bring forth, and what dilemmas there would be in 
a real situation. 
We have examined why and how Hindu's can accept their "lot in life", 
because of the greater rewards offered in future lives. We have also concluded, 
within this chapter, that Nietzsche's elitism is of a cultural or spiritual variety. 
Between those concepts there is a distinct difference in the interpretation of elitism. 
Nietzsche was largely uninterested in economic, political, or social differentiation. 
His call for a hierarchial system may be considered somewhat nostalgic and 
eccentric, but as mentioned previoiisly this should not be confused with re^ social 
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hierarchial systems. 
Nietzsche seemed to be in love with the idea of artists and "genuine" 
philosophers, being pampered and nurtured by a system such as that found in 
ancient Greek civilization. Such a "new"aristocracy of philosophers would replace 
the liberal democratic system. Where such a cultural elite would come from was of 
no importance to Nietzsche, as long as they were allowed to thrive. This is the 
antithesis of the Caste system, in which there is no freedom of movement. 
Nietzsche insists that, "the essential characteristic of a good and healthy 
aristocracy, is that it experiences itself not as a function, but as their meaning and 
highest justification - that it therefore accepts with a good conscience the sacrifice of 
untold human beings who, for its own sake, must be suppressed and diminished to 
incomplete human beings, to slaves, to instruments" (F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good 
and Evil. 258). These "instruments" are not just those of a lower caste or slaves in 
a social sense, nor indeed the working class of the Industrial Revolution. These 
"instruments" can be anybody. Nietzsche seeks to improve man's lot by searching 
for the Ubermensch prototypes, within all races, classes, etc. Only a few will be 
accepted within this elite group (one would not be elite i f everyone was that 
prototype). Nietzsche stresses that it is part of our nature to live within a 
hierarchial structure. What he is saying is that we must allow this elite (be they 
Jews, Aryans, wealthy, poor), to have the strong attributes with which to achieve 
this highest of levels. It is stated in Warren's, Nietzsche and Political Thought, that 
although Nietzsche believed that within our society, class structures were an 
inevitable and natural occurrence, he personally thought that it was the working 
class of Europe, who possessed greater potential and strength than the bourgeoisie. 
By no means was Nietzsche a socialist, but Nietzsche saw the working class as 
exhibiting the potential to search for something more than what the Christian work 
ethic provided. In other words, the individual, who rises from the herd has no 
other identity, but characteristics of strength from the potential in the human spirit. 
Nietzsche seeks the men, who are at a loss with the identity of the world and do not 
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wish to conform to society's expectations. He asks for such men to look for 
something within this world of being and becoming. 
What of the rest, those who do not aspire to conceive and grasp the positive 
nature of life, as Nietzsche envisioned it? In order to understand the Ubermensch 
there must be a division, a herd of those who would by their nature follow. One 
needs black to understand white. There would be nothing to compare with i f there 
were no herd to contrast with. The Bourgeoisie in Nietzsche's view were a class to 
contrast the 'aristocracy' with and to recognize as following a sordid path in life. 
Theirs is a herd mentality which may teach others how not to live. 
To conclude what we have examined in this chapter are the concepts of 
power and morality, which are evident in Nietzsche's philosophy. Nietzsche views 
power, be it physical, social, political, as something that derives from a "will to 
power", something within us that wants to obtain strength. The hierarchical 
division has always existed socially due to material conditions of economic 
scarcities. Nietzsche believed that we can go in two directions, one of them leading 
to a mediocre lifestyle, unsearching, moving along with the pack, and taking 
minimal risks. The other path allows spiritual growth, freedom, and the ultimate 
challenge of discovering the most which life has to offer. In order for us to realise 
this difference, there must exist both types. We realise that there does exist a 
"master type and caste", which is distinct from the herd, the ordinary, and the 
mundane. As Nietzsche says of "the two futures of mankind", one is "constant 
growth of mediocrity" and the other is "conscious distinctions self-shaping. A 
doctrine that creates a gulf : it preserves the highest and the lowest kind (it destroys 
the mean)" (F. Nietzsche, Will to Power. 953). 
Nietzsche's philosophy may be interpreted in part as a belief that denotes 
power, a philosophy that exploits domination and mastery over the herd. It can also 
be read as an ideology which instills ideals about man and his ability without the 
guidance of a moralistic society. Can we accept Nietzsche as embracing both of 
those concepts? Is it possible for us to believe in the philosopher who stresses 
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responsibility, positive freedom, equality, but only for a few? From a sociological 
viewpoint one would not think of Nietzsche's philosophy as being individualistic, 
yet again, we stress that Nietzsche's stance is "one of spirit". 
Nietzsche, I would imagine, was antagonistic towards moral views, in either 
Eastern or Western philosophical discourse. One has to agree with the Tracy Strong 
statement that, "for Nietzsche, most of what men understood as moral and 
metaphysical problems are in fact not problems at all, but merely consequences of 
confused and self serving manners of thinking" (T. Strong, op. cit., p89). 
As human beings it seems we need morality to shield us from the fear of the 
unknown. Our lives become void of meaning i f we take away our moral stance and 
obligations. Nietzsche is not concerned to promote morality, yet he is concerned 
with man's actions and duties to himself Is this not a form of inward morality? 
Nietzsche is adamant about obtaining a way of life, which is justifiable in our 
terms. His way is a powerful one. I f indeed life is a "Will to Power", then life is 
harsh and it requires cruelty and immorality. The question we must ask ourselves is 
whether Nietzsche actually cares - especially i f the question gets in the way of 
human progress. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Nihilistic and Ascetic Aspects 
Nietzsche is often referred to as a nihilistic philosopher who uses the 
viewpoint of Nihilism as a base from which to develop his philosophical ideas. As 
Steven Heine has stated Nietzsche, "says 'no' to all conventional attitudes, views, 
and values in order to achieve a holy 'yea-saying' beyond assertion and denial, 
optimism and pessimism, tragedy and scepticism - a perpetual process of self-
overcoming and self-domination" (S. Heine, "Dionysus Against the Buddha : 
Nietzsche's 'Yes' and the Buddhist 'No' ", in N . Katz (Ed.), Buddhist and Westem 
Philosophy. p243). This chapter will introduce and examine Nietzsche's three 
central "yea-saying" doctrines. Eternal Recurrence, Wil l to Power and the 
Overman, while continuing to compare Nietzsche's ideology with Asian thought. 
Within the latter section of this chapter we wil l highlight certain aspects of 
both Hinduism and Buddhism, which are used as examples by Nietzsche, as a 
means of clarifying his arguments for a "new beginning" in philosophical thought. 
From Hindu (or Brahmin) belief Nietzsche has been said to have used asceticism as 
a mirror, "in which to reflect all the ambiguities of Nietzschean nihilism" (M. 
Hulin, "Nietzsche on the Suffering of the Indian Ascetic", in G. Parkes (Ed.), 
Nietzsche and Asian Thought. p64). As for Buddhist thought a more philosophical 
comparison can be made within the concepts that both Nietzschean and Buddhist 
philosophy seek, "an emancipation from the concepts of good and evil" (S. Heine, 
op. cit., p245). This analysis will hopefully shed some light upon the question of 
why Nietzsche dismisses Buddhism at such expense when, as we will understand at 
the conclusion of this chapter. Buddhism and its philosophy had as much (if not 
more) to offer Nietzsche as his beloved Brahminical model. 
Before we resume our investigation of the nihilistic overtones in Nietzsche's 
thinking, which were derived from his knowledge of Eastern thought, it is 
important to note that much of Nietzsche's knowledge of India and its philosophies 
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stem from his reading of Schopenhauer. Although we can point to several sources 
of Nietzsche's knowledge of Indian philosophy as the forbearers to the nihilistic 
overtones in Nietzsche's writings, we can also show that Nietzsche's viewpoint and 
use of nihilism is an extension of Schopenhauer's "critical pessimism" (Danto). 
Nietzsche's conclusions are quite different from traditional nihilism. 
Because of extreme pessimism (for example : "Blind Will") Schopenhauer 
believed that life was an empty concept which did not make any sense. Reality, as 
Danto states, for Schopenhauer, ... "has neither name or form. The world we live 
in and seem to know has no ultimate reality, and that our attachment to it is an 
illusion" (A. Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher. p28). Much the same can be said 
pertaining to aspects of Hindu and Buddhist thought, but let us not make 
conclusions at this point. Indeed, arguments will be made later in this chapter that 
propose the thought that, when examining nihilistic concepts within Asian thought, 
all is not as it seems at first glance. 
Returning to Nietzsche, we can conclude through his "yea-saying" views of 
life that Schopenhauer's nihilism is not a view shared by Nietzsche. In examining 
Nietzsche's 'positive' views on life and living, such as his claim of a form of life 
beyond what is "good and evil", his "will to power", the concept of "eternal 
recurrence", the "innocence of becoming" and the "overman concept", would it not 
be safe to say that Nietzsche implies something radically different from 
Schopenhauer's conclusion and indeed from the thinking of the Russian nihilists of 
the 1850s and 1860s? Nietzsche saw these men to be against the theory that the "in-
itself of things must necessarily be good, blessed, true, and one" (F. Nietzsche, op. 
cit., 1005) and certainly this is a step in the right direction in Nietzsche's analysis. 
Nietzsche, however, views Schopenhauer as someone who "did not understand how 
to defy this wi l l ; he remained entangled in the moral-Christian ideal ... see(ing) it 
as bad, stupid, and absolutely reprehensible. He failed to grasp that there can be an 
infinite variety of ways of being different, even of being god" (F. Nietzsche, Loc. 
Cit.. 1005). 
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What is nihilism to Nietzsche? How does he use it, and how can it help his 
'new beginning' to flower? M . Blanchot suggests that Nietzsche's nihilism is a sort 
of "extreme that cannot be gotten around, and yet it is the only tme path of going 
beyond; it is a principle of a new beginning" (M. Blanchot, "The Limits of 
Experience : Nihilism" in D. B. Allison (Ed.), The New Nietzsche. pl21). 
Nietzsche finds that the world around him is starting to disown God. God is dying, 
i f indeed he isn't already dead, when the Russian nihilists contemplate the "etemal 
strife of wi l l with wi l l " (A. Danto, op. cit., p30), and so too Kirkegaard's 
Christianity "or the young Marx's ("I hate all gods") belong to that tuming point in 
the history of the world from which the divine light has withdrawn" (M Blanchot, 
Loc. Cit., pl21). 
We start to understand even at this point of the critique something of 
Nietzsche's suspicions of religions (e.g. Buddhism) in the era of change, the era of 
devaluating all "highest values" into nothing, but utter nonsense. According to 
Nietzsche this is where the Russian nihilists and Schopenhauer have gone wrong. 
They are still tied to the supposition that the wil l is something which has capacity, 
that "all that has being is only a willing ..." (F. Nietzsche, Gay Science. 127). 
Schopenhauer, and the like, assume that there must have been a goal for the world, 
a meaning for the world, and that it has now been lost. Nietzsche argues that the 
world is always "becoming", but as Schacht explains in his work, Nietzsche, this 
view of the world should not be misconstrued as teleological, for Nietzsche realizes 
that existence does not have any particular goal. Hence, "becoming does not aim at 
a final state, does not flow into 'being'" (F. Nietzsche, Wil l to Power. 708). Here 
we see that Nietzsche breaks away from Schopenhauer's concept that the world is 
wi l l but since wil l is blind and irrational, life is devoid of purpose and sense. As 
Schacht states, "he takes strong objection to Schopenhauer's impressment of it into 
metaphysical service, in which it becomes the name of that in which the world 
ultimately consists" (R. Schacht, Nietzsche. p208). 
This breakthrough takes form in Nietzsche's dialogues about Wil l to Power. 
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As Zarathustra states one must "put your wil l and your values upon the river of 
Becoming; what the people believe to be good and evil betrays to me an ancient will 
to power" (F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. I I "On Self Overcoming"). This 
"wil l to power", or rather this "striving for domination over the next man", (F. 
Nietzsche, Daybreak. 113) is not some sort of teleological theory, but rather, as 
Schacht explains in Nietzsche. Nietzsche suggests that "the will to power [is] not a 
being, not a becoming, but a pathos - the most elemental fact from which a 
becoming and effecting first emerge -" (F. Nietzsche, Wil l to Power. 635). 
Schacht goes on to explain that because wil l to power is a pathos. Wil l to Power 
"cannot be that of which the world itself consists" (R. Schacht, op. cit., p207). 
Furthermore, "The world, for Nietzsche, ourselves and all else included, is to be 
conceived neither as some sort of substance or collection of material entities, not as 
'spirit' or ' w i l l ' , but rather as the totality of such dynamic quanta or fields of force, 
in a condition of internal tension and instability" (R. Schacht, op. cit., p208). In 
other words, Schacht is describing wil l to power as a most unnihilistic response 
from one who is often labelled a nihilistic. 
Indeed, Nietzsche is breaking new ground. Danto called Nietzsche's 
particular brand of nihility, extreme nihilism. Call it what you wil l , but to call 
Nietzsche purely a nihilist is missing the point. Certainly, Danto and other writers 
of note place Nietzsche in a different category than Dostoevsky for example, but 
surely i f one were to identify Nietzsche as a pure and steadfast pessimist then too 
one must also take into account his positiveness. 
The first step is to announce that God is dead, ("this means God, but also 
everything that, in rapid succession, has tried to take his place - e.g. the ideal, 
consciousness, reason, the certainty of progress, the happiness of the mass, culture, 
etc." (M. Blanchot, L o c . Cit.. pl21) and conceive and acknowledge that, "a more 
manly, warlike age is coming, which wil l , above all, bring valour again into honour 
to that end many brave pioneers are needed now the secret of realizing the 
greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment of existence is : to live 
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dangerously!" (F. Nietzsche, Gay Science. 283). 
It would seem that Nietzsche's concept of nihilism is contradictory. By 
disowning God and current society Nietzsche is actually attempting to create a more 
positive aspect of reality; from an extreme negative concept he seems to constmct a 
positive. Nietzsche never lets one ponder mundaneness in anything, certainly not 
when writing about his positive feelings towards our existence, concepts such as the 
"wil l to power", or the "overman" ideal. Yet we realize that this dichotomy of 
thought exists for Nietzsche to arrive at a more extreme form of nihilism. Blanchot 
sums up Nietzsche's thoughts on this subject when he states that, "nihilism is the 
impossibility of coming to an end and finding an outcome in this end. It tells of the 
importance of nothingness, the false renown of its victories; it tells us that when we 
think of nothingness, we are still thinking being. Nothing ends, all begins again, 
the other is still the same, midnight is only a covered over moon, and the highest 
noon is the abyss of light from which we can never escape - even through death and 
that glorious suicide Nietzsche recommends. Nihilism here tells us its final and 
rather grim truth: It tells of the impossibility of nihilism" (M. Blanchot, op. cit., 
pl26). 
Although many aspects of Nietzsche's view of nihilism wiU seem optimistic 
to those steeped in the pessimism of the East, to followers of Westem morality 
Nietzsche's convictions are frightening. Although with Zarathustra, Nietzsche 
introduces the concept of the "Ubermensch" (overman), he also introduces "etemal 
recurrence", which gives him a reputation for extreme nihilistic beliefs. What is 
"eternal recurrence", and can we agree with Nietzsche that this is a "yea-saying" 
concept? In our interpretation of "etemal recurrence" we must understand that, 
although Nietzsche did intend the concept to be accepted as a cosmological tmth 
(which is rather difficult to swallow) the importance lies within the context of the 
"overman" idea. "For Nietzsche, the overman is he who experiences etemal 
recurrence of the same events as his own innerbeing - the "same", the sameness of 
man and cosmos, power and bliss in the total character of life" (S. Heine, op. cit., 
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p258). 
"Eternal recurrence" for Nietzsche's "overman" is the belief that all events 
in the universe have occurred an infinite number of times in the past and will 
continue to occur in the future, an infinite number of times. Once this concept is 
understood man can appreciate his attachment to his world and in doing so he can 
also appreciate an acceptance of his existence. The question one must ask is 
whether this independence can give comfort for the human condition, which, "wants 
deep, deep, deep, eternity" (F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra IV "The 
Drunken Song"). 
For Nietzsche this was an attempt at solving the "riddle of life", positively, 
through an extensive search for a new path. This concept, of course, was visualised 
as having a focal point (i.e. "overman") to instigate man's new role in life. Once 
the "overman" is envisioned, man wil l be able to walk over "the abyss" for man's 
worth "is that he is a bridge and not a goal" (F. Nietzsche, op. cit.. Prologue 3-4). 
Certainly Nietzsche is asking a great deal. Specifically he is asking for a 
reconsideration of the pure nihilistic viewpoint that the "wil l" for life ceases to 
exist, because life itself is not everlasting. Schopenhauer capitulates in stating that 
"everything passes away, therefore everything deserves to pass away. And this is 
justice, this law of time. That it must devour its children" (O. Schutte, Beyond 
Nihilism. p44). 
Nietzsche's revamped association with the Heraclitean world in flux lets us 
consider our lot as not such a bad one after all. With this background information, 
this chapter wil l attempt to explore some relevant comparisons between Nietzsche 
and Asian philosophy. In doing so, it is also important to understand what 
Nietzsche uses (symbolically) from India. Therefore part two of this chapter will 
examine the link between Nietzsche and Indian asceticism and its use as "a mirror" 
(see p i ) of Nietzschean Nihilism. After this expose, the content of argument will 
shift over to a more philosophical comparison between Nietzschean thought and 
Buddhist philosophy, exploring the similarities and differences in their nihilistic 
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overtones. 
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"Brahminism and Christianity - there are recipes for the feeling of power, 
firstly for those who can control themselves and who are thereby accustomed 
to a feeling of power; then for those in whom precisely this is lacking. 
Brahminism has catered for men of the former sort, Christianity for men of 
the latter" (F. Nietzsche, Daybreak. 65). 
When comparing Nietzsche and Brahminism we must understand its 
(Brahminism) value as a model, as a metaphor for Nietzsche's philosophy of power 
(see Chapter One). The "model" of the Indian ascetic is quite significant in 
Nietzsche's work. Nietzsche, to say the least, was fascinated by Indological ideas 
such as Brahminism. Although he was fascinated by the subject we must 
understand, before launching into this study, that "Nietzsche was ultimately a victim 
of the lacunae in his information concerning Indological matters, and a prisoner of a 
certain stereotypical image of India carried by the culture of his time" (M. Hulin, 
op. cit., p66). So we must understand this comparison in this light, as a late 
nineteenth century opinion, and not as a diagnosis of what Brahminism is today. 
In Chapter One we discussed the notions of the Cultural Aristocraticism of 
Nietzsche in light of Indian Brahminism and the Laws of Manu. As early as 1876 
(Human Al l Too Human). Nietzsche was concerned with the phenomenon of 
asceticism. From the first chapter we know that Nietzsche was infatuated by the 
"network" of rules and regulations of the Brahminical system in terms of asceticism. 
Because Nietzsche viewed the Brahmins favourably within the hierarchical context 
he saw Brahminism as a model of successful living, breaking away from the grip of 
God, into a society which first regulates their own living. Asceticism for the 
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Brahmin in Nietzsche's eyes is, "above all an aspiration to the complete elimination 
of suffering" ( M . Hul in , op. cit . , p67). Through the Vedic (i.e. the study of King 
Visvamitra) hymns, Nietzsche saw within the Indian ascetic tradition something that 
seemed strikingly like his " w i l l to power". The concept is called Tapas. which 
literally means "heat". Not only does the ascetic generate this enigmatic heat he 
also gains a certain kind o f power, a power not only over himself, but a power 
which even the gods fear f rom the ascetic yogi. As Smart states: 
"This idea, that even the gods can be surpassed by the yogi and ascetic, is a 
colourful way of indicating what runs deep in the stream of Indian religious 
consciousness - the belief that the popular cults of the gods themselves 
cannot bring final salvation. They can be implored for worldly boons, but i t 
is the religious teacher who knows the secret of immortality" (N . Smart, 
Religious Experience of Mankind. p91). 
Hul in suggests that i f Nietzsche were only concerned with Brahminic 
asceticism, as representing an aspiration to the complete elimination of suffering 
and the hope for "supreme liberation" (Moksa), then these findings would not have 
been very original (see Hegel's review of Wilhelm von Humboldt's Study of the 
Bhagavad Gita. 1826). For Nietzsche the idea of asceticism, primarily Brahminical 
asceticism, is important in comprehending a kind of self-generating power (wi l l to 
power in association with Tapas) or rather, "asceticism as an accumulation o f 
energy which allows its possessor to escape from the destiny of the so called w i l l of 
the gods" ( M . Hul in , op. cit . , p71-72). This indeed is an extreme sort of 
asceticism, known to be found especially in the Vedanta tradition, and it is not 
surprising that Nietzsche favoured it as a model for his own extremist views. 
This Indian model o f asceticism highlights for Nietzsche mankind's drive for 
independence, his "striving for distinction". According to Nietzsche man ultimately 
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wants to elevate himself over the next man ( "wi l l to power"), and the ascetic of the 
vedanta achieves this function splendidly. As Nietzsche suggests this man achieves 
the feeling o f power, of "self-enjoyment" of the thought that one can control oneself 
and ultimately others. 
I t is quite obvious why Nietzsche used the Indian ascetic model for his 
advances in the philosophy of "power". Yet, at times i t is puzzling as to why 
Nietzsche disassociated himself f rom Buddhism and not complete a possible Pan-
Indian comparison within his philosophy. This question w i l l be addressed in the 
third section o f this chapter. However, as we mentioned previously in Chapter 
One, Nietzsche's extremist views and radical writings favoured Brahminism more 
when held next to the Christian culture f rom which he so desperately wanted to 
break away. We must ask whether Buddhism held for Nietzsche a similar powerful 
contrast. 
m 
Why did Nietzsche rarely draw parallels between Brahminism and 
Buddhism? Hul in writes that although Nietzsche was familiar with the concepts of 
Buddhist philosophy, "he hardly ever draws the parallels between Buddhism and 
Brahminism" ( M . Hul in , Loc. Cit . . p71). Hulin goes on to suggest that the reason 
for Nietzsche's failure to contrast Brahminism to Buddhism is this : "the fact that 
Buddhism had a historically attested founder, conjoined with its "missionary 
character", leads Nietzsche like many of his contemporaries, to see i t constantly as 
comparable with Christianity, whereas Brahminism lends itself less comfortably to 
such an approach" ( M . Hul in , Loc. Ci t . . p71). 
Although the Brahminical system goes to more extremes when comparing 
Ascetic l i fe to Buddhism; a Buddhist's l i fe can still be seen in our Western eyes as 
being ascetic. Although Buddhism claims to fol low a "middle path" (between 
asceticism and hedonism) we know that compared to our own western lifestyle 
Buddhist monks live a l i fe of strong ascetic principle. Nietzsche seems to 
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"domesticate" Buddhism, in rejecting the notion of strict monastic ascetic practice, 
which he certainly must have known to exist. Hulin suggests that the reason for this 
may be, "because he needs i t (Buddhism) as a fo i l in his interminable polemic 
against Christianity" ( M . Hul in , Op. Cit . . p73). The parallel that Hulin envisions 
is with early Christianity, which as Nietzsche admits i t , "basically was aiming at the 
same thing as Buddhism" (F. Nietzsche, Samliche Briefe: Kritische 
Studienausgabe. p367). 
Hul in sees early Christianity, "as a retreat f rom the tumult of the city, on 
abandoning o f worldly ambition, and a return to the delights of inferiority -but that 
i t lost its way . . . " (M. Hul in , Loc. Cit . . p73). He suggests that the problem lay 
within the lack of cultural awareness of the lower classes, the "Chandala" type, and 
all their misery. So the Buddha, for Nietzsche, is used as a model to show a more 
successful saviour than Christ, for he, "obtained for himself and made accessible to 
his disciples the kind of atamaxy that Jesus knew for a moment, but which he had to 
abandon on the cross and o f which the church subsequently lost even the memory" 
( M . Hul in , Loc. Ci t . . p73). 
Here Nietzsche's well known attack on Saul (or Paul), the precursor to the 
"routinization" (see Weber) o f religion, takes on an Eastern parallel. Nietzsche in 
the "Antichrist" tells us that Buddhism does not make the promises of early 
Christianity, but fu l f i l s them, whereas Christianity makes promises, and does not 
keep them (see "Antichrist", 42). The rantings and ravings of Nietzsche's attack 
are well documented and there is no need, or indeed, there is no advantage in 
discussing them in this chapter outside of the context mentioned above. But what is 
interesting for us, who are looking at Nietzsche through a Pan-Asian eye, is that we 
see Nietzsche's philosophy as having been greatly enhanced by his knowledge of 
India and the East. What is alarming, however, is his choices and manipulations of 
ideas f rom Asian philosophy. Above all one has to notice that at times Nietzsche 
selects only those aspects o f Asian thought, which best suit its own philosophical 
points. His primary objective is to bring his philosophy to l i fe , and i f needed, to 
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attack the concepts of his time in an effort to accelerate change. 
What this chapter intends to suggest is that a parallel may be found between 
Nietzsche's concepts and Buddhism in their respective attempts to surpass "good 
and evi l" . Nietzsche may have commended the Buddhist spirit, this we may never 
know for fact, but certainly he was inspired enough to announce that Buddhism was 
an example for a new European spiritualism to duplicate. Why then do those 
philosophies disagree in their respective conclusive arguments on the nihilistic 
stance? 
As mentioned previously in this chapter, Nietzsche may be looked upon as a 
philosopher who ultimately surfaces as someone who is optimistic. The reason for 
this seemingly optimistic view is due to his three central affirmative doctrines, 
"eternal recurrence", " w i l l to power", the "overman", and the idea that man can 
achieve innocence at becoming what he is. As Heine was quoted previously as 
saying, Nietzsche's views were meant to achieve, "a holy yea-saying beyond 
assertion and denial, optimism and pessimism, tragedy and scepticism - a perpetual 
process of self-overcoming and self-domination" (S. Heine, op. cit . , p243). 
What Buddhism is for Nietzsche stands as an important piece of the puzzle 
in understanding Nietzschean nihilism. Buddhism for Nietzsche is yet another 
subject, which is f u l l of contrasting literature. We find that at times Nietzsche 
compares Buddhism to his own positive concepts as something that "represents an 
emancipation f rom the concepts of good and evil" (S. Heine, op. cit . , p245). But 
on the other hand, as Heine explains, "he dismisses Buddhism as a 'weary 
pessimism', merely a tonic to soothe over-sensitized nerves rather than strengthen 
the spirit" (S. Heine, Loc. Cit . . p245). One can scan through the pertinent 
literature f rom Nietzsche on Buddhism and find that, like most of his opinions, 
there are contadictions. 
One particular, and rather important, passage f rom the W i l l to Power tells us 
of his (perhaps hidden) respect for Buddhism when he suggests that "Eternal 
Recurrence" is, "the European form of Buddhism : the energy o f knowledge and 
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Strength compels this belief" (F. Nietzsche, W i l l to Power. 55). Obviously this 
suggests to us a Nietzsche who sees Buddhism as something that also endures our 
nihilistic state of being, our aimlessness in the world, and tries to achieve something 
f rom this structure. This is where Nietzsche denies his Western upbringing. Hjs 
structure can be seen as kindred to the Indian response to l i fe and living. I t is 
understood that the importance and significance of nihility, of negativity was 
realized before the Buddhist movement. Yet the Buddhist philosophies would seem 
an ample place for comparison for Nietzsche. As Abe suggests: "The negativity of 
human l i fe is felt more seriously and deeply in Buddhism than among the followers 
of western intellectual traditions. This is true to such an extent that i t is not 
considered inferior but equal to positivity" ( M . Abe, Zen and Western Thought. 
p l 3 0 ) . 
Not only would Nietzsche have been impressed with this notion of nihilism, 
but also with Buddhism's use o f i t as a proverbial "stepping stone" to something far 
beyond quibbling over the virtues of "good" and "evil" . Again M . Abe states : 
"However imperative i t may be f rom the ethical point of view, i t is, 
according to Buddhism, illusory to believe i t possible to overcome evil with 
good and to thereby attain the highest good. Since good and evil are 
mutually negating principles with equal power, an ethical effort to overcome 
evil with good never succeeds and results in a serious dilemma" ( M . Abe, 
Zen and Western Thought. p l32) . 
Nevertheless, this is where the difference between Buddhism and the 
Nietzschean "yes" lies within the Buddhist philosophy (which w i l l be discussed in 
detail in Chapters Three to Five). In Buddhism one wants to achieve emancipation, 
" f rom the existential antinomy of good and evil and to awaken to emptiness prior to 
the opposition between good and evil" ( M . Abe, op. cit . , p l32) . Whereas 
Nietzsche wants to go beyond good and evil , we see that with Buddhism the aim is 
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to go back to emptiness, a non-being. This is quite a different stance from 
Nietzsche's "active" nihilism, which accepts l i fe as not being empty, but concurs 
that nihilism helps in the conclusion. Nietzsche's revaluation of all values 
(unwertung alle werte) attacks the traditional positivist principles (Western) with a 
vengeance, yet vindicates his own positivist principles, incorporating the 
Ubermensch, as his role model in "active" nihilism. This had led to Nietzsche 
being "regarded with suspicion in the West" ( M . Abe, op. cit . , p l34) , and a traitor 
to Western philosophical tradition. 
Is this actually true considering Nietzsche's past nihilistic positivism? The 
idea o f nothingness is the ultimate idea in Buddhism, and to think that Nietzsche 
accepts this extreme form of Eastern philosophical discourse would be incorrect. 
Nietzsche is neither f rom the East or the West philosophically speaking. He forges 
ahead positively, even i f man's fate is nothing more than the here and now. As 
Heine suggests, Nietzsche may have given a veiled reference to Buddhism in 
"Zarathustra", when he states : 
"hardly are they born when they begin to die and to long for doctrines of 
weariness and renunciation They encounter a sick man or an old man or 
a corpse, and immediately they say, ' l i fe is refuted ' " (F. Nietzsche, 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. p4-5, in N . Katz (Ed.), Buddhist and Western 
Thought. p245). 
Undoubtedly, Nietzsche is on the extreme of traditionalist Western 
philosophy, and influenced by Schopenhauer, he sought knowledge of the Eastern 
philosophies. Nietzsche was a man and philosopher who wasn't afraid to forge a 
new path into an unknown wood, as long as i t was his path. The tools he uses to 
forge this path are obviously f rom different ideas and concepts but i t is the way in 
which he uses them, and the manner in which he finds his conclusions, that marks 
him an extremist in the Western eye. This is not to say that he sides with the East 
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(in the style o f Schopenhauer), his stance backs his own ideals. 
I t is true, as Heine states that, "Nietzsche and Buddhism both recognize that 
the individual, uneasy in the flux of impermanence and interrelations, reacts by 
objectifying his hopes in illusory fixed objects which he tries to grasp and stymie in 
an ultimately futi le fashion, and that this obsession gives rise to an endless round of 
suffering and recurrence" (S. Heine, op. cit . , p248). Nietzsche's ideals may be 
ultimately seen as Heine suggests as "the awakening of a courageous attitude, amor 
fati (love of fate), the new formula for saying yes by which one internalizes fate - i t 
becomes the supreme possibility of man, identical with his creativity" (S. Heine, 
op. cit . , p253). So there is possibility with time, there is the chance to become 
your own God, i f you are to trust in Nietzsche's optimism. The Buddhist stance 
would not be favourable to this concept, for time, all time, is a disease and one 
should try to find ways to alleviate oneself f rom this trap. 
Nietzsche's "job" is to alert us to the possibilities of living to the fullest and 
most energetic that we can in the here and now. By doing so he must try to 
establish a way beyond Christian moralism, the good and evil that Buddhism also 
transcends. A suggestion for Nietzsche's placing on the philosophical scale is that 
he, like man to Ubermensch, is a possible bridge between East and West, shrinking 
the differences between the two, or at the very least, acknowledging a better 
understanding between the two traditions. We are not thinking of moralistic 
philosophy trying to understand Eastern negativism, but nevertheless Nietzsche 
came out o f this structure to proclaim a new beginning. He leaves behind the 
Western presumption that good is superior to evil and looks beyond both of them 
for a richer understanding. We w i l l also see in Chapter Four that Buddhist 
philosophers, such as Nagaijuna have a different understanding of traditional 
Buddhist negativity. For now, we must be satisfied in thinking that, "Although 
Buddhism and Nietzsche travel comparable paths of negativism to freedom, both 
finally negating the distinction between negativism and affirmation, traditional 
Buddhism assumedly does not conclude with a "yes" " (S. Heine, Op. Cit . , p259), 
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as Nietzsche's conclusions claim to. 
37 
CHAPTER THREE 
"A Sense of the Earth" 
" [ ] l i f e becomes vacant, unintelligible, and we like to have something 
which we can grasp and take as final. This something final we generally 
like to represent by the notion of soul or s e l f (D. T. Suzuki, The Field of 
Zen. p57). 
This chapter w i l l investigate the notions generally referred to as the "se l f , 
the "soul", the "ego", the conceptions belonging to the interpretation of our 
existence, in the world as we know i t , as found within Nietzschean and Buddhist 
thought. Within this context we shall see why Nietzsche and the Buddhists, for the 
most part, reject the traditional Western notion that the self must exist and that there 
must be an object, or "thing", corresponding to a noun. 
The implications of this study are extremely relevant in a comparison 
between Nietzsche and Buddhism. Indeed this thesis would be incomplete without 
devoting significant chapters to this subject. Because o f the momentous relation 
between Nietzsche's "self" and the Buddhist "not-self i t is necessary to split the 
revelations of "self" between Chapters Three and Four. The latter w i l l concentrate 
solely on the subject o f language and causality within Nietzschean and Buddhist 
thought, including the Madhyamaka school and their primary philosopher 
Nagarjuna. 
Although the concept of language is relevant in this chapter, i t is initially 
important to stress the basic principles of "self", and what i t means to Nietzsche and 
the Buddhists, before we ponder their use of language. This chapter w i l l give a 
detailed account on "self" by familiarizing the reader with the different "mind set" 
between East and West in establishing the concepts of mind and body respectively, 
as something whole or separated. Of course, the question w i l l be asked as to where 
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Nietzschean thought fits within these categories, i f at al l . As we have seen from 
past comparisons between Nietzsche and Asian thought in previous chapters, 
Nietzsche is a di f f icul t philosopher to categorize. I t is the intention of this chapter, 
as in the previous chapters, to keep an open mind, not only in categorizing 
Nietzsche's philosophy, but also in looking at the various sects and divisions within 
the Buddhist tradition, as we explore the concept of " se l f . For the sake of 
comparison Zen Buddhist thought w i l l be introduced later because of the significant 
role i t plays in comparison with Nietzsche. 
Before we begin with Nietzsche's ideas o f the "se l f i t is important to 
initially understand what we mean, and to an equal extent, what Nietzsche means by 
the term "self" or "soul". Throughout Nietzsche's writings we often find the 
concept of the "soul" or the "ego", in this study we w i l l only be interested in these 
subjects in their relationship and interpretation of the concept of the "se l f . This 
concept can be confusing, and it is perhaps best explained by Schacht, "this 
postulated entity is frequently denoted by a considerable number of names or labels 
other than the more traditional one of "soul", such as "the ego", "the subject", and 
also "the mind" or "spirit". I t does not greatly matter to him (Nietzsche), which o f 
them one might prefer to use, what concerns him is the idea o f the existence of any 
such entity" (R. Schacht, op. cit . , p l30) . For our purposes we shall use the term 
"self" in a philosophical context not to be confused with any psychological 
terminology o f what "ego" is, or "self" is, to the person. As Schacht so readily 
admits, "Nietzsche would only be interested in the notion o f our rejecting the idea 
as a "f ic t ion", that is "of no use" ", (R. Schacht, op. cit . , p l30) , and something 
which leads us to the dilerrimas o f which both Nietzsche and Buddhism (as we shall 
see) wish to be free. 
Why does Nietzsche attack the notion of "self"? In the Western sense of the 
word Nietzsche argues against the philosophical tradition of subjectivity, which in 
our Western world subsequently separates the mind f rom the body. His denial o f 
the Western philosophical notion that the self is something that can be known, a 
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something that is "real", stems largely f rom the Socratic notions of the "se l f as 
being the centre of content in l i fe itself [1] . Nietzsche is noted for his views on the 
subject o f the "self" as having no real subject. The concept of the "se l f as an agent 
(the "doer o f deeds") is rejected. Because, according to Nietzsche, the "se l f , or 
the " I " stands or falls within a logistical and metaphysical context. Nietzsche 
believed that i t placed too much emphasis on something that can obtain complete 
objectivity in its knowledge. The "se l f concept turns away f rom a more 
primordial, or a more instinctual, existence of mind/body. Belief in a Cartesian 
"self", as being the most "excellent of all finite things", leads to this separation of 
mind/body as a whole. 
Indeed, Nietzsche believed that the instinctive behaviour of animals and 
plants offer a model for the conduct of human existence. Hence, "the more [the] 
emphasis is placed on the rationality o f the thinking I , the more one tends to forget 
the importance of the senses as natural human capabilities" (A. Kogaku, "The 
Problem of the Body in Nietzsche and Dogen", in G. Parkes (Ed.), Nietzsche and 
Asian Thought. p215). Nietzsche understood that the idea of "consciousness", the 
notion that we think, that we understand what we are, was a necessity for man's 
evolution, whereas "the solitary and predatory man would not have needed i t " (F. 
Nietzsche, Gay Science. 354). The point that Nietzsche stresses is that our notion 
of the "self" can be a restrictive one, and we are certainly nowhere near any 
evolutional perfection on behalf of mankind. The separation of "doer and deed" lets 
us believe that we are "above" our natural instincts, and that we perceive ourselves 
as not only being responsible for our deeds but also subject to punishment for them 
(see Nietzsche, "Metaphysics of the Hangman"). Hence, we give birth to such 
notions as morals and the concepts of truth, error, good and evil , ignorance and 
learning and so on. Nietzsche rejects such oppositions and "imagines them as points 
along a single continuum" (A. Nehamas, Nietzsche: L i fe and Literature. p44). 
Nietzsche believed that the world that we construct is a world which we 
should not feel guilty about, "we are not in error to live in i t , to think and talk 
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about i t as we do, and to continue to do so" (A. Nehamas, op. cit . , p95). The error 
that we make lies within our belief of what is the real nature o f the world. I t is this 
metaphysical perception which is our true error, for according to Nietzsche any 
metaphysical "truth" (including science, mathematics, and language) grossly hinders 
our progression towards an Ubermensch. 
Along with these metaphysical concepts, Nietzsche also attacks the concept 
o f God, as being guilty o f "anti-nature", or "anti-life". Like Buddhism, Nietzsche 
believes strongly that in order for us to return back to "nature" one must see the 
whole o f mind/body as the true path to our progression, as he tries to halt the 
metaphysical attempt of separating the two. According to M . Abe, "I t was 
Nietzsche's intention to cause the value judgements of "true" and "false", which had 
been inverted in the name of God to be again reversed, and thus to recover l i fe and 
naturalness, which had been robbed in the name of God" ( M . Abe, "Zen and 
Nietzsche", in N . Katz (Ed.), Buddhism and Western Philosophy. p3). 
Nietzsche calls for a recovery of the "sense of the earth", when he calls for a 
"higher body" to emerge f rom the present one. I f one develops the body one must 
comprehend the importance o f being closer to nature. This notion fits in with all of 
Nietzsche's concepts, which so often are seen as enemies to the moralist tradition. 
When Nietzsche calls upon man to return to nature he undeniably asks man to give 
up the concept of God. This leaves man alone, able to boldly achieve a viable 
understanding o f how he stands within this world and how he is intrinsically a part 
o f the world . Man does not need the promise of something unimaginable to make 
his l i f e purposeful and f u l l of meaning. Nietzsche's ideal man is at one with this 
world in al l its finality. Unlike Camus' portrayal of man as an isolated being in an 
irrational and meaningless world Nietzsche's Ubermensch accepts not only his fate 
in the existential surroundings, but relishes the idea, as an opportunity to live a freer 
l i fe without a world f u l l o f metaphysical "truths", "morals" and so on. 
As usual with Nietzsche there seems to be an underlying attack on the 
church in many of his writings. This subject, of course, is of no exception. As 
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Schacht states, "Nietzsche is a rather enthusiastic participant in what he terms the 
attempt "to assassinate the old soul concept" " (R. Schacht, op. cit . , p l31) . 
Schacht points out that Nietzsche sees a connection between the "soul hypothesis" 
and the "God-hypothesis". "The soul hypothesis leaning upon the God-hypothesis 
for its philosophical and theological intelligibility, and the God-hypothesis leaning 
upon the soul-hypothesis for much of its evidence and intuitive appeal (and perhaps 
even being modelled upon i t ) " (R. Schacht, Loc. cit . , p l31) . Again we see 
Nietzsche's distrust o f the duality (A exists, therefore B must exist). 
In the Gay Science. Nietzsche initiates distrust with those who are in need of 
a God and those who refuse to fol low his advice to "de-deify" nature and proceed to 
naturalize ourselves within this world (109, Gay Science). Nietzsche believed that 
man was starting to abandon the concept of God ("God is dead". Gay Science. 343) 
and was looking for an alternative to Christianity and the church. Once Nietzsche 
announces the death of God, he is also condemning all Judeao-Christian morality 
and values and this, one has to believe, is the most important point of the 
condemnation of God. Nietzsche needs to be rid of the Judeao-Christian world in 
order for advances to take place, within his philosophy of change. Nietzsche wants 
to emphasize the urgent need for reform in the way humans live, and for what they 
actually lived for . In Daybreak Nietzsche concludes : 
"- How many there are who still conclude : 'L i f e could not be endured i f 
there were no God!' [ ] - therefore there must be a God (or existence 
must have an ethical significance)! The truth, however, is merely that he 
who is accustomed to these notions does not desire a l i fe without them : that 
these notions may therefore be necessary to him and for his preservation -
but what presumption i t is to decree that whatever is necessary for my 
preservation must actually exist! As i f my preservation were something 
necessary! " (F. Nietzsche, Daybreak. 90). 
In short, Nietzsche sees man's incapability to live naturally, and his false 
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need to l ive within rules and regulations, as a hindrance to his development. 
According to Nietzsche metaphysics was something that came out of a 
"barbarious primordial" cultural belief that when one dreams one is learning about a 
second real world. This was the origin of metaphysics, the breaking of the single 
line, the breaking of the continuum. According to Nietzsche, "without the dream, 
one would have had no occasion to divide the world into two. The dissection into 
soul and body is also connected with the oldest idea of the dream, likewise the 
postulation o f a l i fe of the soul " (F. Nietzsche, Human A l l Too Human. 5). 
A t this point, we must ask ourselves what keeps this separation intact, even 
today, in our Western world? One could say that our society is based upon a 
workable model (for the privileged?), which serves to protect a happy medium, and 
confronts any extremist movements with vengeance. According to Nietzsche, we 
have made ourselves into "calculable" people; those who need to know why we are 
here, and for what purpose. A people who have to understand the role they play 
within society, as well as what they have to achieve to reach over to God's world. 
In order for us to reach this "other-world" Nietzsche argues that we created within 
ourselves a human being who agrees with a societal functioning role, a role which 
creates, through cause and effect an image of how things become (Gay Science. 
112). 
Unfortunately for man Nietzsche concludes that we have been unable to get 
past this image (or for that matter, behind i t ) . Man's "instinct of weakness" (Gay 
Science. 347), encourages this lack o f confidence to challenge these so-called 
metaphysical "truths" in order to obtain an affirmative l i fe in this world. Man 
clings to the notion of a "self", or a "soul entity", because he believes in the 
separation of doer and deed, o f thing and property. The concept of the soul is 
fundamentally conceived and preserved throughout time because of a belief in 
"language" (that there must be an object or thing corresponding to a noun). For 
Nietzsche (like Wittgenstein) belief in words or grammar leads to the belief in the 
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self, as something real, and imaginable. As mentioned in the introduction of this 
chapter, we w i l l later deal with the question of language and causality in great 
detail. Nevertheless i t is important to understand language's function, "the 
grammatical habit", within Nietzsche's argument in order to comprehend how the 
concept of the "self" or "soul" has existed and persevered for so long. Language 
fuels our need for wanting to belong to society, according to Nietzsche; i t gives us 
"purpose" and stability. Yet as Schacht states, i t "does not warrant the conclusion 
that the interpretation o f these events as "deeds" of which some sort of soul-entity is 
the "doer" is sound" (R. Schacht, op. cit . , p l35) . 
Language gives man the strength to believe in his reasoning, i t gives 
structure, and balance, for i t conceives aU effects as conditioned by a subject. 
Nietzsche finds that the problem with language lies within the objectification of 
words and their meanings. As Nietzsche summarises, "we operate with nothing but 
things which do not exist, with lines, planes, bodies, atoms, divisible time, divisible 
space - how should explanation even be possible when we first make everything into 
an image, into our own image" (F. Nietzsche, Gay Science. 112). I t is precisely 
language's effect which keeps man "pinned down" within a metaphysical 
stranglehold. 
Schacht does suggest that Nietzsche does not deny the existence of mental 
acts (i.e. thinking, wi l l ing , etc.), but suggests that such "events" are misinterpreted 
by man when conceived as "internal acts logically distinct f rom bodily behaviour" 
(as was primordial man's interpretation of dreams) (R. Schacht, Loc. cit . , p l35) . 
He further suggests that Nietzsche sees that, " i t is this misinterpretation which is at 
least immediately and most directly responsible for the further erroneous 
interpretation o f the occurrence of these events as involving the existence o f a 
mental entity to perform these putative "acts" " (R. Schacht, Loc. cit . , p l35) , and 
that man "simply assimilates i t , as a single general 'doer-deed' mode of 
conceptualization and self-interpretation, along with the structure o f the language 
they learn" (R. Schacht, op. cit . , p l36) . 
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Thus we have Nietzsche's interpretation of the problem of the separation of 
mind/body. I t is apparent that a comparison can be made with Buddhism, as we 
shall see in the second section o f this chapter. But, i t is also important to signify 
the relation that this comparison presents. In as much as i t adds to a belief that 
Nietzsche was a "keen" student of the East the comparison w i l l also show a cogent 
argument to the effect that he was not a "champion" of the Buddhist view of "not-
self", after al l . Nevertheless, he can be compared with the Buddhist "I-lessness" or 
"emptiness" in the world (which is believed to be the "way of being of 
everything"). This is not, however, a view found among some Buddhist sects 
which assume an existence in some other heavenly world. "On this point" as 
Kogaku suggests, " i t is far f rom Platonism, and Christianity - and indeed quite close 
to Nietzsche's active nihilism" (A. Kogaku, op. cit . , p216). The second part of this 
chapter w i l l indeed try to understand this odd marriage of the two respective 
philosophies on the problem of the body, and w i l l present a closer association 
between Nietzsche and Buddhism on the subject o f nature and the "sense of the 
earth". 
n 
With respect to the principle of the "self", the philosophical understanding in 
Buddhism is that i t (the self) must "dissolve" by means of meditative introspection 
in order for someone to attain enlightenment and to be free f rom mind, and free 
f rom the "bondage of ignorance and craving". This should for the Buddhist result 
in the complete rejection of the notion of "person substance". Once a Buddhist 
refutes the concept of "person" he is not permitted to assume the existence of 
anything else that does not relate to a fact, or anything that is not based on 
experiential evidence. Subsequently, the " I " does not refer to any real subject. 
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Hence, the self is rejected, and the notion of self, as an "agent" (i.e. Nietzsche's 
"doer of deeds"), is rejected as well. 
Of course, this is very similar to Nietzsche's idea that consciousness is not 
experienced as a separate element, because it never appears in its truest form. 
Obviously there is a strong resemblance to Nietzsche's work when compared with 
the Buddhist's principles of the self. For Nietzsche losing one's belief in the 
metaphysical "self" or the belief in a "soul" as separate from the body, is for the 
Buddhist quite similar to "losing personality belief constitut[ing] the attainment of 
stream winner status" (p94, Selfless Persons. Collins). (The Buddhists believe that 
there is just a sequence of perceptions, thoughts, etc., with no persistent entity (a 
self) underlying these. See Chapter Four). The problem of life for the Buddhist, 
and for Nietzsche, is this "separateness". "In Buddhism", as Kogaku suggests, "one 
can naturally learn the Buddha way both through the body and the mind. But i f one 
strives with the mind alone, one will never in all eternity attain the Buddha way" 
(A. Kogaku, op. cit., p220). As we wil l see later, many Buddhists practice to 
attain enlightenment through somatic practice, as in the case of Zen. Mind is most 
definitely seen as a subsidiary, as a part of the whole, in understanding Zen 
meditation, but let us go back to the question of "self" within the whole of 
Buddhism. 
Primarily, the Buddhist doctrine is the doctrine of becoming, for all things 
are composite. Hence all things are prone to decomposition, which means 
everything is in flux. In the Buddha's "Four Holy Truths" (the structural 
framework for all his teachings), we find with his first truth that all life is dukha 
(suffering), and we are all subject to this condition. The second truth is that the 
cause of our illness is craving, the third states that i f we remove our craving, a cure 
is possible, and lastly the fourth points to a recovery through the eightfold path (the 
middle way). 
Within the "Four Holy Truths", man is described as being composed of five 
groups of attributes (skhandhas). These five groups have significant importance as 
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to how the Buddhists view the "self", and a detailed account is necessary at this 
point. First there is Rupa. translated as body, or form, in the sense of the physical 
body. Second there is Vedana. which are feelings, or the sensations that one has in 
living, be they pleasant feelings, or unpleasant ones. Sanna is translated roughly as 
the concept of perception, mental or sensuous. Generally it is described as 
"reaction to sense stimuli, described as 'awareness with recognition' or the idea 
which arises from such reaction" (C. Humphries, Buddhism. p94). The fourth 
group is Sankhara. which is thought of as including all tendencies both mental and 
physical or elements in consciousness ("all moral and immoral volitional activity") 
(C. Humphries, Loc. cit., p94). Lastly, there is Vinnana. translated as 
consciousness, in a constant state of flux. ("It is the centre of conscious existence 
in its ever changing forms") (C. Humphries, Loc. cit., p94). Whilst all of the 
Skhandas are in a state of flux, and impermanent (hence, not "true se l f ) , it is the 
last one (Vinnana) that we want to concentrate on, in showing the Eastern-mindset, 
as being opposed to the Western tradition. 
Vinnana, as defined by Humphries, is the equivalent to "self-consciousness", 
the perception by the individual that he is at the moment different from his 
neighbour; the belief that " T am I , not you" (C. Humphries, Loc. cit., p94). 
Because it is still imbedded in the concept of a "self", and impermanent, it is one of 
the "fetters which have to be broken" (C. Humphries, Loc. cit., p94) before one 
attains enlightenment and achieves the state of Nirvana. This idea is otherwise 
known as "Sakkayaditti" (that is, the error of thinking that one is of separate 
existence to the world). Nevertheless, as Humphries suggests, it is something 
which is acceptable (like Nietzsche's acceptance of "consciousness" as necessary for 
man's evolution) among Buddhists, as something to live with whilst working on the 
long journey towards enlightenment : "to this extent only it is the soul of man, 
always remembering that it is impermanent and changing every moment of the day" 
(C. Humphries, Loc. cit., p94). Hence, we understand that the Buddhist describes 
all phenomena as impermanent, and in doing so they grasp the notion of not-self. 
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As Harvey affirms, "Buddhism emphasises that change and impermanence are 
fundamental features of everything, bar Nibbana. Mountains wear down, material 
goods wear out, and all beings, even God, die" (P. Harvey, An Introduction to 
Buddhism. p50). 
The question that we must ask ourselves, is Nietzsche as extreme in his 
philosophy on the question of the "self"? 
To highlight the above questions, and other comparisons between Nietzsche 
and Buddhism, Zen philosophy wil l be examined, especially its emphasis on the use 
of somatic practice, as a means of liberation from the world (see Chapter Five). 
Both the Zen tradition and Nietzschean thought view the world and the self 
as 'false', as "not fact". The Zen Buddhists offer a rather similar account as to why 
we believe in the world the way we do (that is, through craving) to Nietzsche's idea 
that the value-interpretations concerning the world (which he saw as empty and 
deceptive) had a positive aspect (a "silver lining") in so much as they preserved life 
through a disguised "wil l to power". Indeed, there is no such "silver lining" in the 
Buddhist tradition, as there is in Nietzsche's philosophy. For the Buddhist, as we 
mentioned above, all the world is "ignorance and deception" and, as one cannot find 
any positiveness in this world, then it must be absolutely negated. Nietzsche seems 
to hold on to hope, that at least there may be an answer to life disguised amongst 
what he saw as deceptive and empty constructs (such as the self). In Will to Power. 
Nietzsche calls for something positive out of 'our' interpretation of the world, and : 
" that previous interpretations have been perspective valuations by 
virtue of which we can survive in life, i.e. in the wil l to power, for the 
growth of power; that every elevation of man brings with it the overcoming 
of narrower interpretations; that every strengthening and increase of power 
opens up new perspectives and means believing in new horizons " (F. 
Nietzsche, Wil l to Power. 616). 
48 
And yet, Nietzsche later admits that because the world is constantly in flux, 
"as something in a state of becoming" (F. Nietzsche, Loc. cit., 616), there is no 
truth to life (see Chapter Four, on a "new hermeneutic"). This calls to mind 
Buddhism's "triple world of deception" conception of the world of transmigration, 
consisting of three notions: (1) sensuous desire; (2) form; and (3) formless pure 
spirit (i.e. the world is merely a creation of the mind, a mind that distinguishes 
between right and wrong, good and evil and so on). This also calls to mind, 
seemingly, a connection between Zen and Nietzsche for both conclude that it is the 
"discriminating" mind from which everything arises. "For when there is 
discrimination", says M . Abe, "value interpretation is involved" (M. Abe, op. cit., 
p4). 
Let us return to this "fork in the road", where Nietzsche's "positiveness" 
seems to clash with Buddhism's "world of deception". This "road" does indeed 
split into new paths for both philosophies when we compare the world of Zen "non-
awakening" to Nietzsche's "will to power" ideal, "an impulse and a drive to impose 
upon an essentially chaotic reality, a form or structure, to shape it into a world 
congenial to human understanding, while habitable by human intelligence" (A. 
Danto, Loc. cit., p30). 
Interpreting Zen, we understand that it is impossible to look at the world 
objectively, because the mind cannot be objectively grasped. The Buddhist 
principle of the "triple world of deception" cannot be objectively realized, for i f we 
did realize this, it would be from our mind, our interpretation, hence the world is 
then merely an illusion. This is probably why so much of Zen Buddhist practice is 
concerned with the somatic, that of the body, which we wil l discuss later in this 
chapter. 
To look further into this difference between Nietzsche and Zen, we find that 
Nietzsche is problematic for the Buddhist philosopher in that his "will to power" 
model seems to be stuck in the mire of the deceptive world. With Zen, for 
example, when one realizes his enlightenment, and is free of illusion and all its 
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trappings, does he not abandon any notion of positiveness in the world? The state 
which the Zen Buddhist wants to attain only happens, "when seeing, hearing, 
perception, and consciousness are simply abandoned" (M. Abe, Loc. cit., pl4). 
But with Nietzsche, is not "will to power" the attempt to see, hear and perceive in 
certain ways? As Abe states: 
"Zen, like Nietzsche, emphasises the delusory nature of the world and 
severely admonishes against seeking for Buddha and setting up Buddha. 
Unlike Nietzsche, however, Zen does not affirmatively establish anything in 
the background of either the world of Buddha - Zen establishes "nothing" in 
their background" (M. Abe, op. cit., pl4). 
Using this "extremist" example may seem unfair to Nietzsche, and yet 
Nietzsche merits such an extremist comparison to complement his own 
unconventional discourse. Nietzsche's philosophy has finally been exposed (as 
anything would be with Zen), as having concepts of objectification. This is not to 
say that he betrayed the "body and mind = whole concept". Both philosophies 
wish to cultivate a higher body. The Nietzschean way is development of the spirit, 
i f you wi l l , through the body to reach the ideal (Ubermensch). The Buddhist way is 
to practice with the body only, in order to realize an "overhuman body". Both want 
to cultivate a "sense of the earth", and at least gain knowledge of how we are so 
intrinsically tied in with the natural world. 
In order for us to realize the somatic practices of obtaining enlightenment, 
let us use Zen again, as an example for mind/body wholeness. With D. T. Suzuki's 
definition of the self in mind, "that something substantial which is continuous as an 
individual entity even after what we call death" (D. T. Suzuki, Loc. cit., p57), let 
us focus closely on what the "self" is according to Zen philosophy. 
As we know, Western religious belief generally assumes the survival of the 
soul, and Zen Buddhism denies that a "soul" or "self" makes any sense once 
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analytically examined. In the West, the idea of selflessness leads us to believe that 
life would be vacant and frightening for there is nothing to grasp onto unless we 
have an idea of a "soul" or "self" to contemplate. Indeed, according to Nietzsche 
and others, morality would cease to exist i f we were to discard the notion of the 
self, or ki l l the concepts of "soul" or God. Yet this is also true in Zen, as D. T. 
Suzuki points out that, "without the notion of self, our social structure itself would 
dissolve, so there must be some sort of self, but this method does not bring us to 
any substantial notion of the self. It is like the method of elimination, when one 
thing is eliminated by saying it is not this and not that, it disappears altogether, like 
peeling an onion, when skin after skin is taken off, we finally come to nothing, and 
there is no onion. But we still think of the onion as something individual, as far as 
the senses are concerned, exists. But when we analyze it, it ceases to exist" (D. T. 
Suzuki, op. cit., p58). 
Suzuki's statement, with its overtones from the Debate of King Milanda. 
analytically explores the notion of self, and at first seemingly leaves us with the 
conclusion of self equalling negation. Indeed, this self that is made up of 
metaphysical errors and not the "true self". This, although incomprehensible, still 
exists, and is obtainable. The Buddhist theory of "anatman" (i.e. non-self) demands 
more than the hopeless negation that occurs when examining the "self closely. 
"Non-atman", or "absolute emptiness" is beyond our comprehension (Gotama 
Buddha himself refused to answer the ultimate problem of reality, for he thought it 
was beyond reach of our "ordinary mind"). Suzuki argues on behalf on Zen, that 
by looking analytically at the self, one is able to "dissect" the self to see of what it 
actually consists. This "dissection" of the self eventually shows us the significance 
of the non-ego, which the Buddha emphasised in his teachings, and that this 
emphasis is the way in which all Buddhists should follow. Indeed, the main 
problem with life, for a Zen Buddhist is with attachment: once rid of it one is also 
rid of the "ego-substance". There is no real self, as we have learned, according to 
Buddhists that we can actually realize, here and now. 
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So we now venture on, into the "world of becoming" as the only truth there 
is. One may ask how the Zen Buddhists attain truth when there is only this "truth 
of becoming". For all Buddhists, there must be a learning towards the Buddha 
way. The Buddhist must go beyond the standpoint of the T in order to become 
enlightened. So - "to learn the Buddha way is to learn the self. To learn the self is 
to forget the self. To forget the self is to be enlightened by all things. To be 
enlightened by all things is to liberate one's own body/mind, as well as other 
body/minds from the bondage of the small T " (Dogen, Shobogenzo. p28). 
The Zen Buddhist goes about this learning of the Buddha way by spiritual 
practice (mind and the somatic (body)). Yet, in Zen, the body has a specific edge 
on mind practice, and can be experienced through examples in Zen such as the Tea 
ceremony, Noh Drama and so on (see Chapter Five). A. Kogaku spells out the 
seven steps in which one should proceed somatically to obtain enlightenment: 
(1) to understand the human body is a part of nature (as we have seen from 
above) 
(2) it is through the body that the human world and the natural world is 
connected 
(3) one must give up the "small-egotistical", " I " because the " I " 
(4) divides itself from nature and 
(5) by doing this, one realizes that there is only one "great I " , which is 
inseparable from nature 
(6) the way to this realization is understanding that the body human is a sort of 
gate that can be used to attain this 
(7) and lastly, at every moment the self lives as the body, in relationship with 
the entire universe, but for the most part we tend to forget this and lose 
awareness of our constant relationship to the whole. 
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Zen Buddhists call the following of these steps "Zazen" which it advocates, 
as a way of using the "gate" or body, to go beyond the self, toward the greater ' I -
less' self. As we know, Nietzsche argues for man to understand and encourage the 
instinctual nature of body, "a realization of the body as a "great" reason which does 
" I " rather says " I " " (A. Kogaku, op. cit., p224). Zazen is different, for it is the 
"procedure by means of which the self is able to transform itself into the pure-body 
self" (A. Kogaku, Loc. cit., p224). In Zazen practice there cannot be any intrusion 
of the mind permitted. This is a self-projecting leap of the body into the world, the 
cosmos. One tries to overcome one's restrictive body through this meditation in 
order to conceive the idea of "superbody", or an "overhuman" body. 
For both philosophies, the body is instinctively closer to nature, but for 
Nietzsche, the belief is that the body is the true self once separated from the " I " -it 
rules the " I " , and once it is beyond the "instruments and toys" (sense and spirit), the 
self is realized as what Nietzsche calls the "unknown sage". This is "self stripped 
naked from the " I " . Nietzsche's self is stripped, clean and free from metaphysical 
trappings, and man can now fully understand his own existence independently and 
freely. 
In conclusion, we have noticed that the similarities found in both 
philosophies is how they view the nature of the thinking mind, and adopt a stance 
which emphasizes body over mind. Nietzsche still retains a certain individuality of 
the self, however, and is not keen on identifying wholly with the concept of the " I -
less self", not being attainable in this world. This is not to say that Nietzsche found 
wholeness of earth or nature a subject for deep admiration, as the Zen Buddhists do. 
But he does, to some extent, separate himself from the notion that man cannot live 
independently from nature. Perhaps this is the truest side of Nietzsche's 
philosophy, an individualist stance, and an existential "awareness" showing through, 
saying that one is to be conscious of choice; choosing meaning creating, and 
expressing one's self identity in the process of acting and choosing responsibly. 
Can Nietzsche's Ubermensch sustain responsibility in the face of Zen's "I-less 
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self"? Certainly, the proximity between Nietzsche and concepts such as Zen thrive 
because of his "condemnation of the traditional exaltation of rational spirit" (A. 
Kogaku, Loc. cit., p224), which inevitably helped Nietzsche to develop his own 
"metaphysics" of the body. 
Nietzsche still retains his title as an "Extreme-Nihilist", a Nihilist who 
creates his own positiveness from nothing. For Nietzsche man is "the strong 
individual, self-sufficient" (F. Nietzsche, Wil l to Power. 97), and this individualism 
must indeed "rub against the grain" when compared to Buddhist thought. This 
inevitably separates Nietzsche's thoughts from the Buddhist's, but it seems evident 
that Nietzsche has much to applaud in the nature of "selflessness", and that they 
make suitable, yet odd bedfellows within this context. 
Footnotes: 
1. Nietzsche saw Socrates as forerunner to the Westernized notion that self-
knowledge was the very content of "the good life". 
2. The first truth emphasizes dukha (suffering), yet as we shall see later dukha 
is only one of the "three marks" of conditional phenomena. The other two 
marks are anicca (impermanence), and anatta (not-self). Within the five 
Skhandha's, one wil l notice that the Buddhists stress that change and flux is 
a fundamental feature in everything of this world. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
"Caves Within Caves" 
The Role of Language in Nagarjuna's and Nietzsche's Philosophy 
"Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means 
of language" (L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. 109). 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, in this chapter we wil l specifically examine 
the contrasts, and the similarity of thought found in Nagarjuna's and Nietzsche's 
philosophical view of language, as a barrier to overcome i f we are to understand the 
reality of existence. For this study it is important that we review the beginnings of 
the Mahayana/Madhyamaka movement. Therefore, a brief historical account will 
be necessary in preparation for a philosophical discourse of Nagarjuna's works. 
In this chapter we wil l examine the non-dualistic view of the Madhyamaka 
school, as a radical breakthrough from traditional Buddhist discourse (especially 
Hinyayana), which compares favourably to Nietzsche's "spiritual breakthrough", 
and his new hermeneutic. The primary area for comparison lies within the two 
philosophers' discourse on language, concentrating on the notion that language 
encourages us to believe that there is substance and reality in the concept of the 
"self". Both Nagaijuna and Nietzsche insist that language assists in this 
misrepresentation, for it leads us into believing in a world as object and entity. 
Although we are primarily concerned with the thought of Nagarjuna and 
Nietzsche and their notions of language and causality, it is important that we also 
examine the views of Ludwig Wittgenstein for his relevant discourse on language, 
and his favourable comparisons to Buddhist ideology. By comparing both 
Nietzsche's, and to a lesser extent Wittgenstein's, attack on the traditional 
metaphysical traditions in Western philosophy to that of the Madhyamaka's crusade, 
led by Nagarjuna, and the transformation of the historical and traditional Buddha to 
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a more fundamental Buddha, we hope to bridge the vast gap between Eastern and 
Western philosophical differences. Indeed this study is perhaps the most important 
within this thesis, for here one finds the heart of the comparison between Asian 
thought and the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. 
For Nietzsche breaking down the "metaphysical truths" is important for 
mankind's maturity and growth. The Madhyamaka Buddhist's attack on language 
and causality is an exercise in obtaining "ultimate truth". Hence, their belief takes 
on a personal responsibility on behalf of those, who "mistakenly cling to the entities 
which confront them in phenomenal reality" and hence to something 
"epistemologically and metaphysically groundless" (G. T. Martin, "Deconstruction 
and Breakthrough in Nietzsche and Nagaijuna", in G. Parkes (Ed.), Nietzsche and 
Asian Thought. pl04). In a sense, i f this chapter strengthens the idea of Nietzsche 
as a radical philosopher, it also shows the Madhyamaka religion as the "prime 
mover" toward a "dialectical deconstructive" side of the Buddha and Buddhism, 
shifting away from any recognition as a historical religion. In short, the 
Madhyamakas and Nagarjuna, become the catalyst to the more radical side of 
Buddhism. 
Part one of this chapter will deal with the historical side of the 
Mahayana/Madhyamaka movement, culminating with the main points in the 
Madhyamaka philosophy. The second part will discuss, in detail, Nagarjuna's 
stance on language and causality by using examples from his "Karika", and the 
"Twelve Gate Treatise". The third part of this chapter wil l link Nietzsche, and to 
some extent Wittgenstein, to the obvious association within their respective 
philosophies to that of Nagarjuna. 
I 
"Ask any Buddhist, practising or professed, to explain the doctrine or its 
rudiments and chances are he will not be able to convey to you its full 
meaning and significance in any satisfactory manner ... This is as it should 
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be. For any positive or objective accounting of the doctrine would surely be 
held suspect". 
(K. Inada, "Problematics of the Buddhist Nature of Self , 
in N . Katz (Ed.), Buddhist and Western Philosophy. p267) 
Within all Buddhist traditions, sects, cults, etc., one concept stands alone, as 
one of the primal and principal notions to grasp in order to understand Buddhism 
and Buddhists. This is the concept of Anatman (non-self). This concept, at first, 
seems to be an example of the frequently mentioned "negativism" in Buddhism, 
which Western thinkers find difficult to fathom. Yet "to say that there is a soul or 
self, or that the soul or self is negated, does not really advance the true 
understanding of the concept of Anatman, except on the linguistic and logical 
levels" (K. Inada, op. cit., pp271-272). This is precisely what this chapter intends 
not to do : relying on linguistic, Western logical explanations. In order to 
understand the Madhyamaka's viewpoint, it is important to abandon our 
Westernized notion of the self; thinking that it exists only because we refer 
linguistically to it. Later, we wil l discuss this dilemma in considerable detail, 
however, it is necessary to first gain a historical perspective as to how and why the 
concept of Anatman developed within the Mahayana/Madhyamaka philosophies. 
The concept of Anatman is an anti-metaphysical statement developed to 
realign what we view as the human experience. Of course, Buddhism succeeded 
Hinduism, and it is well known that "the atman concept still remains in the province 
of the Hindu, who has his own metaphysics and the faith and will to pursue it. 
What the Buddhist or the Historical Buddha reacted against was the inadequacy of 
the Hinduistic metaphysics to account for the so-called worldly empirical nature of 
things. It was not a simple overturn of the atman concept into nullity, but a unique 
overhaul of the understanding of human experience" (K. Inada, loc. cit., p272). 
This chapter does not want to discuss the differences between Buddhist and Hindu 
philosophy in any great detail other than showing that Buddhism itself was a 
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religion based on the matters of change within the human experience and condition. 
From the early teachings of the Historical Buddha (Gotama), we find an important 
aspect in his teaching of anatman in that his response when questioned concerning 
this concept, is often silence. 
As previously stated, pre-Mahayana Buddhist thinking, like the Hindu 
religion and the Hinyanists, maintained the theory of self-causation that cause and 
effect are identical in essence. The Buddha rejects this view on the grounds that it 
is a metaphysical assumption not verified by observation. Self-causation was 
always in the forefront of Buddhism's attacks, yet when confronted with the 
question as to why one should disassociate with Atman, and all metaphysics of the 
world, the Historical Buddha remained silent. This led philosophers such as 
Nagarjuna and Candrakirti to question the reason of this silence from the Buddha. 
Candrakirti (the Madhyamaka philosopher who followed in the tradition of 
Nagarjuna) sought an answer for the Buddha's continual silence to such questions 
as, is the world eternal, is it finite or infinite, or is the soul identical with the body, 
or not, and does the Tathagata (a title of the Buddha) exist after death? Al l such 
questions, indeed those most pertinent for any religion or philosophy, were left 
unanswered by the historical Gotama Buddha. Candrakirti assumed, as did 
Nagarjuna and other prominent Mahayanists, that the Gotama Buddha had a reason 
for this silence. The reason itself leads the Buddhist to an answer and 
understanding which cannot be expressed. This is not to say that the Historical 
Buddha was mute concerning all philosophical questions. 
The Buddha and his teachings of the "middle path" [the early Buddhist 
theory of causation which avoided the extremes of existence such as atthita and non-
existence, natthita. The Buddha avoided those extremes because of notions that 
would lead to believing in eternalism (sassata) and annihilationism (uccheda)] are 
indicators that this was a philosophically "searching" religion. Certainly Buddha's 
theory of causation was formulated to answer the questions about the arising 
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(utpada) and the passing away (niradha) of things. Most importantly for the 
Madhyamaka religion, the Buddha's teaching of the Pratityasamutpada, which 
declares that all entities in the world are conditioned, are devoid of real, 
independent existence, highlights a reluctance to use the spoken word, as an escape, 
or as an excuse to mislead his followers. As K. Inada states : "Even the Historical 
Buddha, it wil l be recalled, was quite mindful and cautious regarding this matter, 
and yet he had no recourse but to use the prevailing language to convey the intent 
and purpose of seeking that concrete nature of reality. In essence, then, we are in 
search of that reality within the matrix of things, however laden it may be with the 
elements of the provisional and conventional natures" (K. Inada, op. cit., p273). 
As Inada suggests there seems to be a reluctance to use language from the 
Historical Buddha and it is this reluctance which the Mahyanists and especially the 
Madhyamaka sect regard as the true nature of Buddhism as a leap forward from the 
"lesser wheel" of Hinyayana to the "greater wheel", Mahayana, within Buddhist 
history. Again, Inada suggests in his introduction to the translation of the 
Mulamadhyamakkarika by Nagarjuna that, "the very refusal to answer categorically 
the metaphysically grounded questions by the Buddha himself should be a constant 
warning to those who facilely resort to labelling any doctrine or facet of Buddhism 
into convenient forms of monism or absolutism" (K. Inada (Trans.), in Nagarjuna, 
Mulamadhyamakkarika. plO). 
The main difference between the Mahayanists and the Hinayanists was their 
interpretation of the Dharmas (in the sense of elements of existence, mental states, 
and things). The Hinayanists believed that the Dharmas had a separate reality of 
their own. The Madhyamaka school declares that because all Dharmas are relative 
they do not hold any separate reality, as the doctrine of the Prajnaparamita 
suggested. According to Nagarjuna, the Buddha's enlightenment consisted of the 
discovery of the causal principle from the Prajnaparamita literature. This literature, 
which appeared first in the first century B.C., remained important until the end of 
Buddhism as the prominent religion in India in the twelfth century A.D. 
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Nagarjuna, one might say, appeared at the "right time and in the right place" to 
rekindle interest in these ancient doctrines, "to provide the necessary corrective 
measures to Buddhist philosophical analysis of man's nature and thereby initiated a 
"new" movement within the Mahayana tradition" (K. Inada, op. cit., pU) . The 
task undertaken was the subject of "reality" and its interpretation through the use of 
language. The passing away of the Buddha had created for Nagarjuna, and for all 
Buddhists a huge vacuum, which contributed to the need to develop the conception 
of an eternal spiritual body. Henceforth, in the Mahayana tradition, the Buddha 
becomes something that is "forever", something that never dies. Because of the 
death of the Gotama Buddha it was important to stress that his physical body was 
not his true body. The Mahayanists believe that the Gotama Buddha's real body is 
his spiritual body (dharmaka) as well as his cosmic body (considered to be the same 
as "Absolute Reality", or Tathata). Hence, Nagarjuna transforms the 
Prajnaparamita literature into the nucleus of all Mahayana belief. As D. J. 
Kulapanuna suggests of the Prajnaparamita literature, "Running through that 
literature is a conflict between absolute reality, the dharmakaya, considered to be 
non-dual (advaya) and phenomenal reality, which is plurality" (D. J. Kulapanuna, 
Causality : The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. pl56). We shall see how 
Nagarjuna adopts the non-duality (advaya) into a leading concept within the 
Madhyamaka philosophy. 
Here we shift from the early Buddhists theories of causation, which was 
employed to explain all types of causation within our world (including "other 
worldly" concepts such as Nirvana) to a Mahayanist explanation of causation 
relevant only to that of the phenomenal world (the actual theory, being considered a 
transcendental theory). For Nagarjuna "reality" in the sense of what we see and 
know "is like a maze ... I f one is caught up in the elements of the maze, one is 
prevented from seeing the passageway and contrawise, i f one is not, then the 
passageway is there without the usual obstructive elements, and thus one is able to 
move freely and easily" (K. Inada, "Problematics of the Buddhist Nature of Self , 
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in N . Katz (Ed.), Buddhist and Western Philosophy. p273). 
For Westerners, the concept of the denial of substance is one which produces 
strong feelings of frustration and mistrust, for we are weaned on notions of finite 
things, clear cut and focused on possibilities. The Madhyamaka Buddhists deny that 
we, as human beings, can see the "other side" to life, let alone conceive the 
concept. A l l that the Buddhist can do is to prepare himself through meditation, and 
to acknowledge the ordinary view of existence as false reality, in order to obtain the 
enlightenment which is within all of us. 
As stated previously the Mahayanists and Hinyayanists differed in their 
perception of the Dharmas. Although the Hinyayanists believed in the 
unsubstantiality of the individual (pudgalahairatmya) they also classified reality into 
certain elements of existence (that is, the Dharmas) much to the Mahayanists' 
chagrin. This led the Hinyayanists to believe in the substantiality of the Dharmas, a 
concept with which the Mahayanists strongly disagreed. The Mahayanists through 
Nagarjuna's interpretation of Prajnaparamita literature adopted the concept of 
sarvadharmasunyata, or the unsubstantiality of all Dharmas. As a consequence of 
the adaptation of this concept Madhyamaka philosophy stresses the unsubstantiality 
of everything that we as common unenlightened human beings see as "real". 
Nagarjuna and the Madhyamaka following are often seen as a religion of "no-
position", "due to the relentless attack on any and all concepts" (K. Inada (Trans.), 
in Nagarjuna, Mulamadhyamakkarika. p24.). 
As we have seen in the preceding chapters Nietzsche, also, has been 
considered a philosopher without a positive stance. Nagarjuna is also viewed as an 
irrational nihilist. A l l they are guilty of is pointing toward an understanding "that 
the reality of things is not bound to logical or conceptual understanding. Reality or 
human experience lends itself to symbolism, but to that extent it must be understood 
that symbolic references are strictly speaking deficient of ultimate reality" (K. 
Inada, op. cit., p25). As we shall see in this chapter, both Nagarjuna and Nietzsche 
have much in common in their attempts to "crack open the shell" of symbolism. 
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language and alleged ontological realities. Let us continue, however, our 
investigation o f Madhyamaka and Nagarjuna, so as to understand that there is 
greater depth to their philosophy and that i t should not be considered pure 
scepticism, but rather, "an open invitation to everyone to see reality face to face" 
(J. Singh, An Introduction to Madhyamaka Philosophy. p59). 
I t is true, that Nagarjuna's systematic philosophical critique against the 
Hinyayanist concepts of the truth of the Dharmas attempts to de-ontologise and 
destroy all familiar concepts of reality. He does not, however, intend to leave his 
followers with a total negative notion of what the world is around us. "He w i l l not 
leave his opponent suspended in so-called de-ontologised mid-air" (K. Inada, 
"Problematics of the Buddhist Nature of Self", in N . Katz (Ed.), Buddhist and 
Western Philosophy. p276) let alone his Madhyamaka fol lowing. As Inada admits 
"He like all true Buddhists, w i l l try his best to return the de-ontologised nature back 
to solid grounds, i.e. inconsistent context with true reality ( s ic ) , without the traces 
or vestiges of the mind's imposition of reality as such" (K. Inada, loc. cit . , p276). 
What Inada is suggesting is that the exercise is a conceptual device, which does not 
entirely lead the Madhyamaka Buddhist to enlightenment, but starts him on his way, 
by realising what is not, before knowing and understanding what is. For language 
i t is the same, "losing the self requires the discard of the fish trap" (H. Cheng 
(Trans.), Nagarjuna, Twelve Gate Treatise. p51). 
When we investigate the principal points of Nagarjuna's philosophy later in 
this chapter, his positiveness may be seen more clearly, yet we are reminded by D . 
T. Suzuki, that this de-ontologisation o f the world is not easily comprehended, 
"This is a staggering idea, but until we are thus thoroughly cleansed o f all the 
intellectual habits contracted since our birth we cannot expect to see the Dharma 
itself" (D . T. Suzuki, Mahayama Buddhism. p l 3 ) . 
One must suppose that the Madhyamaka believer does not have a "blind 
faith" towards Nirvana and enlightenment without first understanding that he must 
make the effort to obtain "enlightenment", and the "absolute truth". Even though 
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the "absolute truth" is beyond all thought and speech and that, according to the 
Madhyamaka religion, the absolute cannot be described, this is not to say that 
teaching towards the "way" is not feasible. Indeed phenomena does not cut us o f f 
completely f rom reality. For "phenomena are appearances and appearances point 
out their own reality. The veil gives a hint o f that which is veiled" ( H . Cheng, op. 
ci t . , p52). Only when this occurs can the Buddhist follower of the Madhyamaka 
comprehend the reality o f the world. I t is, however, important to point out that for 
the Madhyamaka, the phenomenal world is not any different to the world of 
emptiness. Here again is love of non-duality within the Madhyamaka religion and 
that o f Nagaijuna's philosophy. I t is all the same world, just as there cannot be 
cause and effect within this world, because i t suggests separation o f things in itself 
(that is, causality is a contingent relation between separately identifiable events. 
Hence, i f there are no such events, there cannot be causal relations). I t is only 
when the Madhyamaka can comprehend that the phenomenal world is empty that he 
can comprehend the "real" meaning o f the world. In short, we are interwoven 
within the world (the world is both "real" and "unreal", here and now and 
etemalism is all one continuous thing - ever f lowing like a Heraclitian river). Once 
there is a realisation that we are not a world of separate entities, then there can be 
an understanding to what Nagarjuna is trying to convey. In order to understand 
Nagarjuna, we must comprehend that: 
"Buddhism does not acknowledge an undivided ultimate reality. Any 
universal self is understood to be illusory as the individuated s e l f 
(P. Mellor, Self and Suffering : Deconstruction 
and Reflexive Definition in Buddhism. p50) 
In essence, Madhyamaka belief is the epitome o f this statement, which 
suggests that all Buddhist philosophy is generally Heraclitian in concept. As Cheng 
suggests : "The Madhyamakas often claim that they do not hold any position or 
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have any viewpoint of their own. What they are doing is simply using what other 
people believe to point out that the opponents viewpoint involves certain 
contradictions or absurdities . . . all affirmations and negates should be given up . . . " 
( H . Cheng, op. ci t . , p l02) . Hence, the Madhyamaka's repetition of denying 
categories such as birth/death, oneness/manyness, coming in/going forth, universal 
and individuated self and so on, and transforms itself into an extreme form of 
Buddhism and Buddhist philosophy. 
In summary, i t is safe to assume that unlike previous Hinyanan belief, the 
Madhyamakas refuse to participate in any form of discourse that could carry 
ontological implications, which we w i l l see f rom examples later in this chapter. 
Yet, this is not to suggest that Nagarjuna and Mahyamakas deny the Buddha way, 
for i t can be argued that they fol low the Buddha way in the purest form. What the 
Madyamakas do suggest is the acceptance of "thought constructions", and calls for a 
"dialectical deconstruction", which therefore could lead Buddhists away from false 
attachments. This concept of "dialectical deconstruction" attacks "the idea of the 
self as having substance". In this sense Nagarjuna is saying that all things are 
empty. " I f there is nothing burnable, there cannot be the fact o f burning" ( H . 
Cheng, op. ci t . , p57). 
Nagarjuna can be said to have "deconstructed" traditional Buddhist belief, 
which has helped to establish a long tradition of the Mahayana, in several Asian 
countries including Japan, Korea and China. Nagarjuna (in some Buddhist sects a 
Bodhisattva) indeed has much to say, and gives us the tradition, behind the more 
primal meaning, to what the Buddha taught. 
n 
Found within a bundle o f manuscripts in the Samskrta language, 
Madhyamaka philosophy and Nagarjuna's following emerged. The Madhyamaka 
philosophy contained largely in the Madhyamaka sastra of Nagarjuna (and within 
the Catuhsataka o f Aryadeva, a student of Nagarjuna) was found to be greatly 
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different f rom that of the earlier Pali canon. 
There is always a question as to how much Nagarjuna contributed 
independently to the Madhyamaka school, as opposed to what he borrowed from 
past manuscripts within earlier Buddhist traditions. Certainly the Mahasanghikas, 
an early Buddhist school, contributed much toward beliefs and traditions of the 
Madhyamaka/Mahayanist fol lowing. The Mahasanghika school believed that the 
Buddha was not just an historical figure, but was "transcendental, supramundane 
eternal, and infinite" (J. Singh, op. cit . , p7). Indeed, the Mahasanghikas believed 
the historical Buddha to be "fictitious", "sent down" to earth to live like an ordinary 
human being, in order for people to understand that empirical knowledge could not 
give us an insight into reality. As J. Singh states, "Only sunyata which transcends 
all worldly things can give us a vision of the real. A l l verbal statements give us a 
false view of the real; they are mere thought-constructions" (J. Singh, op. cit . , p8) 
(my emphasis). Singh even goes as far as saying that "the germs" of all the 
important tenets of the Mahyamaka world and of Nagarjuna's philosophy were first 
found within the Mahasanghikas. 
Previously we discussed the influence o f Prajnaparamita literature upon 
Nagarjuna's philosophy, which brings us to question of whether Nagarjuna 
contributed any original concepts to the Madhyamaka philosophical movements? 
The answer is unquestionably in the affirmative when we consider the dialectic he 
evolved, as well as his rediscovery of the Mahasanghika and Prajnaparamita 
documents; works which were so important to the Mahayana movement. 
Nagarjuna's dialectics took the form of a tetralemma, a four alternative 
argument structure. First within Nagarjuna's writings we find a positive thesis 
which is opposed by a negative thesis. These two theses are the basic alternatives, 
conjunctively affirmed to form the third alternative, and disjunctively denied to 
form the fourth alternative. Before looking at examples of these dialectics i t is 
important to understand the reasons for Nagarjuna using this format. Nagarjuna 
believed that the Buddha's silence concerning questions of "reality" being 
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transcendent to thought was in itself an extremely important statement. In addition, 
Nagarjuna learned the concept o f the four alternatives f rom the Buddha. What 
Nagarjuna did was to systematise the four alternatives and "mercilessly exposed the 
disconcerting implications o f each alternative, brought the antinomies of reason 
luminously to the fore by hunting out f rom every cover, and demonstrated the 
impossibility o f erecting a sound metaphysic on the basis o f dogmatism or 
rationalism. This was his dialectic" (J. Singh, op. ci t . , p l 3 ) . Nagarjuna's 
originality consisted of driving reason away by the use o f a rigorous logic, and of 
equipping the mind towards the acceptance o f "prajna". The following example 
which w i l l illustrate this style o f Nagarjuna is taken f rom Mulamadhyamakkarika, 
chapter eight, on the "examination o f the Doer and the Deed" 
(Karmakarakapariksa). 
. Verse One 
A doer in a completed state cannot create a deed in a completed state. Again a doer 
in an uncompleted state cannot create a deed in an uncompleted state. 
Verse Two 
When a doer is in a completed state, there w i l l be no doing and also a deed w i l l be 
without a doer. Likewise, when a deed is in a completed state, there w i l l be no 
doing and also a doer w i l l be without a deed. 
Verse Three 
I f a doer in an uncompleted state creates a deed in an uncompleted state, then (in 
actuality) the deed w i l l be without a cause and the doer w i l l (in itself) have no 
cause. 
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Verse Four 
Without a cause, there can be no effect or an efficient cause. Without these (effect 
and cause), there can be no functions of doing, doer and deed. 
Verse Five 
Without these functions etc. [doer, deed], there can be no factors (dharma) and non-
factors (adharma) of experience. Without factors and non-factors there can be 
nothing arising out o f them. 
Verse Six 
When there is no effect there w i l l be no way of arriving at liberation or the heavens. 
For all doings or functions w i l l fa l l into purposelessness. 
Verse Seven 
A completed-uncompleted doer cannot create a completed-uncompleted deed. For, 
how could the mutually conflicting completed and uncompleted states co-exist as 
one? 
Verse Eight 
A completed doer cannot create an uncompleted deed nor can an uncompleted doer 
create a completed deed. For ( i f the above conditions are not accepted), there upon 
all fallacies w i l l fo l low. 
Verse Nine 
A completed doer cannot create an uncompleted deed not that o f a completed-
uncompleted deed. This is according to the reason expanded in previous verses 
(i.e. verses 2 and 3). 
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Verse Ten 
A n uncompleted doer also cannot create a completed deed nor that of a completed-
uncompleted deed. This is according to the reason expanded in previous verses (i.e. 
verses 4, 5 and 6). 
Verse Eleven 
A completed-uncompleted doer cannot create either a completed or uncompleted 
deed. That is to be known by the reason stated previously (i.e. verse 7). 
Verse Twelve 
The doer is dynamically related to the deed and the deed to the doer in order to 
arise. We cannot perceive any other cause for their establishment or completion. 
Verse Thirteen 
Thus, by way of the refutation of the (static concepts of the) doer and the deed, the 
concept or seizing or clinging (upadana) can be known. And basing the analysis on 
both the doer and the deed, various other entities (i.e. phenomena) can be 
understood. 
(Nagarjuna, K . Inada (Trans.), Mulamadhyamakkarika. p71-75) 
Obviously, the reading o f Nagaijuna's philosophy can be a tedious venture 
into the often confusing world of Eastern philosophy and thought. I t would, 
however, be a misjudgment to consider this work utter nonsense. Indeed, what we 
have looked at above, is a most significant piece o f philosophical questioning, 
especially in regard to Nietzsche, as the concept of the Doer and the Deed is the 
crux of Nagarjuna's philosophy. Certainly, as J. Singh suggests on the reading of 
Nagarjuna, 
"to the unwary reader, Nagarjuna appears to be either a cantankerous 
philosopher out to controvert all systems, or as a sophist trickster wringing 
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f rom an unsuspecting opponent certain concessions in argument by artful 
equivocation and the chuckling over his disconfiture or as a destructive 
nihilist negativing every view brusquely, affirming none". 
(J. Singh, op. cit . , pl5-16) 
Perhaps Nagarjuna may be considered a deconstructive philosopher, yet this 
is not to say that he had only nihilistic tendencies. His purpose for the dialectic was 
to disprove views such as the Hinyanists belief in the realities o f the Dharmas, and 
to attack the notions of the dogmatist or rationalist, not to prove a view of his own. 
Nagarjuna's principal objective, for the sake of the transcendental Buddha, was to 
resolve the conflict between phenomenal and ultimate realities. In his use of the 
dialectical method, Nagarjuna demonstrates that the world is interwoven, and even 
f lowing , as he negates our so-called "realities". Now that we have established the 
importance o f Nagarjuna's contribution to Buddhism, i t is important to understand 
the language (and it 's intricacies) o f the Madhyamaka religion. 
From the early Mahasanghikas the Madhyamaka adopted the idea that 
empirical knowledge could not give them an insight into reality. Like the 
Mahasanghikas, the Madhyamakas believed that sunyata (emptiness) was the only 
understanding o f the world which could give them a vision o f the "real". 
Therefore, i f the world is sunyata, then all verbal statements give a false view of the 
reality of the world; they are merely thought constructions. The world, to the 
Madhyamakas, is f u l l of phenomena that are dependent on conditions. Because 
phenomena are so dependent upon those conditions, they are devoid of any 
substantial reality. This is what the Prajnaparamita literature teaches: Sunyata and 
the conditioned and unconditioned thought constructions. 
I f then, all is emptiness (sunyata), then what is real to the Madhyamaka? 
Even the concept of Nirvana, which is unconditioned thought, would be classified 
as empty. Both Samsara and Nirvana, the conditioned and unconditioned, are mere 
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thought constructions and are considered devoid of reality. In effect, the ultimate 
reality may be called sunyata, in the sense that sunyata as the ideal transcends all 
empirical determinations. Together with prajna (i.e. Prajnaparimita, transcendent 
insight that allows one out cease to indulge in thought constructions and empirical 
determinations) the concepts of sunyata and prajna developed, as the backbone of 
the Madhyamaka system. 
Let us look further at the meaning of the word sunya (or sunyata), which 
translates as empty or emptiness. A non-Buddhist translation of sunya is often 
viewed as nihilism in the West. This is a gross mistake. Ontologically, sunya "is 
the void which is also fullness" (J. Singh, op. cit . , p37). In the usual cryptic style 
of Buddhist philosophy, one could say that because sunya is nothing, that i t has a 
possibility to also mean everything. Obviously this use of sunya is pertinent in the 
Madhyamaka philosophy as a symbol of the inexpressible. Indeed, i t is a stepping 
stone for the Buddhist to grasp the primal meaning of his religion. Singh best 
describes the .concept sunyata as an "awareness of the importance of reason to 
realise truth and the urge to rise to a level higher than reason in order to realise i t 
when the thinker lets go his foothold on discursive thought, i t is only then that he 
can mount to something higher" (J. Singh, op. cit . , p42). 
In a sense to call the Madhyamaka system nihilistic would seem a fair view 
of this seemingly graspless religion, i f i t indeed rejects all views of reality. Yet, 
having said that, i f we look with an" Eastern "eye" we must acknowledge the fact 
that to the Madhyamaka Buddhist, there is hope and salvation by way of 
understanding true reality by negating all views of reality that we see at present. In 
a sense, much like Nietzsche's extreme nihilistic overtones, after the destruction of 
the empirical world there is hope in finding our true selves, our true way of l iving, 
l ike the phoenix rising f rom the ashes. To the Madhyamaka Buddhist the way to 
"rise" out o f the fire is to negate these views of reality. In a sense i f they accepted 
their fate o f l iving in a world that is a "big l ie" , then yes, the nihilistic label would 
be correct. But like Nietzsche, there is not acceptance, but rather an urge for 
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change. That the whole of the Madhyamaka system is dependent on the 
understanding o f sunya and sunyata, may be diff icul t for Westerners to grasp, and i t 
is important to understand the existential, here and now qualities of Buddhism as 
such, and as a form of practice of the inner self Inada describes this concept of 
"emptiness" : 
"In the f inal identity of form and emptiness, a climax in the ideological 
development is reached where the sutras, in particular the whole 
prajnaparamita sutras, elaborate on the point that all forms are in the nature 
of void (sunya). Thus, such forms in the nature of a sentient creature or 
being (sattva), a soul or vital force Qb/a), a self (atman), a personal identity 
(pudgala) and separate "elements" (dharmas) are all essentially devoid of any 
characterisation (animatt, alaksana). The quest for voidness or emptiness of 
the personal experiential components (pudgala-sunyata and of the personal 
ideational component (dharma-sunyata). This is the final goal of the 
Nirvanic realm, here and now, without residues (anapudhisesn-Nirvana-
dhatu), and achieveable by a l l " . 
(K. Inada (Trans.), Nagarjuna, Mulamadhyamakkarika. p l 2 ) 
However important is the concept of sunyata is to the Madhyamaka religion, 
Nagarjuna warned his followers against making a fetish out o f i t . Prajna is what 
one wants to aspire to in gaining transcendental insight, to believe that the world is 
empty would be a nihilistic ideal. The concept of sunyata prepared for the spiritual 
disciplines of Prajnaparamita and its six spiritual qualities : 1) Dana, charity; 2) 
Sila, withdrawing f rom civ i l deeds; 3) Ksanti, forbearance; 4) Virya, enthusiasm 
and exertion; 5) Dhyana, concentration; 6) Prajna, transcendental insight (i.e. : 
Prajnaparamita is the highest kind of knowledge). Nagarjuna believed that without 
acknowledgement o f sunyata, everything would be out o f joint (see Karika X X I V , 
14). Hence, we must see sunyata, as more of a therapeutic device, instead of a 
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nihilistic concept within the world o f the Madhyamakas. 
So, i f we agree that reality is transcendent to thought and cannot be upheld 
within the dichotomies o f the mind, and that according to the Buddha and his 
doctrine o f the "middle way", which tells us that things are neither absolute being 
nor absolute non-being, then what is Nirvana to the Madhyamaka? According to 
the Madhyamaka such an understanding cannot be revealed upon this earth, because 
o f the concept o f the two truths (conventional, or what we know as l iving human 
beings, and ultimate truth). There is no real way to discover what such concepts as 
Nirvana, absolute truth, etc. are in actuality. I f we know what they are then we 
would be enlightened, but enlightenment w i l l not be achieved as long as we sit here, 
trying to philosophize upon such questions! AH we can say of Nirvana, within 
Madhyamaka thought, is that i t is not something which is produced or achieved. In 
a sense Nirvana is the same as the world as we know i t , but for the disappearance of 
the fabrications o f thought constructs. 
Again, as mentioned previously, phenomena do not cut us o f f f rom "real" 
reality. Phenomena points the way to "reality", or "the veil gives a hint to that 
which is veiled". Once this veil is l i f ted, one can understand the concept of truth 
(tathata) and the medium in which i t reveals itself (tathagata); the epiphany of 
reality. I t is the "reality" within us which has been brought to the forefront, that 
makes us yearn for Nirvana and the freedom that i t induces. 
The concept o f Nirvana, no matter which area of Buddhism one looks at, is 
a d i f f icul t concept to grasp. For the Madhyamaka Buddhist, the concept of Nirvana 
is the same as his conception of Buddha, and of reality. For, "Nagarjuna treats the 
same thing, under four or five different headings, his object being to show that 
whatever be the verbal designation, f rom whatever side the problem of the absolute 
be tackled, the result is the same" (T. Stcherbatsky, The Concept of Buddhist 
Nirvana. p56). Because nothing has a being or essence of its own, we are all the 
same, ever flowing concept (no being = svabhava) and therefore to make the 
concept o f Nirvana something other than what we already are is a 
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misrepresentation, opposed to everything that Nagarjuna and the Madhyamaka 
religion professes. As a summary o f the Madhyamaka concept, i t would be useful 
to paraphrase K . S. Murty 's outline of Nagarjuna's philosophy. I t : 
1. Avoids the extremes o f affirmation and negation (the is and is not). 
2. Does not a f f i rm that there is substance or self 
3. Attempts to critically review what is, and to be more aware of things as they 
are. 
4. Is a middle approach (middle way). 
5. Is neither realism or idealism and definitely not nihilism. 
6. Nothing has its own being - everything is in relation to other things. 
7. Hence, nothing has an independent existence. 
8. Nothing is an integral entity : (things we see and deal with are made up of 
constituents - dharmas). 
9. The dharmas as wel l , have no substantiality or self 
10. A l l things are mutually dependent and related (for this makes them what they 
are). 
11. A l l things are void (sunyata). 
12. Things are related to each other and determined. 
13. Hence, nothing has a character of its own. 
14. Nothing has a being o f essence of its own (no own being (svabhava)). 
15. The world is in f lux , constantly changing. 
16. Things which are conditioned (and naturally derive their being) are not real. 
17. Categories are not real - unexplainable and self contradictory (i.e. there is no 
birth/death, oneness, moneyness, coming in or going forth, etc.). 
18. Hence, this is the philosophy of Advaya (or the non-two). 
19. Hence, i t is a non-dualistic philosophy. 
(K. S. Murty , Nagarjuna) 
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One must stress to the Western mind, that to the Madhyamaka Buddhist his 
religion is not looked at as nihilistic. As mentioned previously, the "reality" of the 
absolute cannot be apprehended by thought, and is incapable of verbal elaboration 
(aprapancita) that is the two-truths, absolute and empirical. Yet to the 
Madhyamaka, there is no doubt that the concept exists and tha;t the importance 
(similar to Nietzsche's?) lies within the person himself. After al l , enlightenment, in 
any Buddhist school, arises f rom an understanding, f rom practice, and meditation, 
f rom no-one other than yourself To conclude, K . K . Inada best describes 
Nagarjuna as a philosopher who is leather diff icul t to classify : 
" I f Nagarjuna is not to be labelled an absolute monist, radical pluralist, 
nihilist, negativist, relativist, logician, and finally dialectician, what then can 
be said o f him and his philosophy? I t would seem that there is but one 
definite and practical approach to guide us. I t is that Nagarjuna's thoughts, 
however elusive they seem to be, must be made coincident with the most 
original and fundamental teaching o f the historical Buddha, i.e. the doctrine 
of the middle path". 
(K. Inada, op. cit . , p21) 
So, too, we must conclude that Nagarjuna was also largely responsible for 
transforming and "routinizing" the historical Buddha to that of the spiritual and 
transcendental one. This may have been his greatest contribution to the Buddhist 
world. 
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"Motion is a word, motion is not a cause" 
(F. Nietzsche, op. cit . , 21) 
Nietzsche's assault on language was an attempt to "break through" the 
traditional philosophical ideals and concepts of existence, and to try to create a new 
philosophy. As we have seen, the Madhyamaka philosophy agreed with such an 
inspirational "break through". Cheng states : "One o f the chief sources of 
confusion in philosophical reasoning, San-lun (the Chinese equivalent to the 
Madhyamaka school) Buddhist contended, is that philosophies often fa i l to see the 
emptiness of words and names. People tend to think that words, names, and 
concepts are attached to objects and belong to them inherently" ( H . Cheng, op. cit . , 
pp 18-20). As we shall see Nietzsche is not in this category of philosophers. 
I t is now probably safe to assume that Nagarjuna denies that words actually 
denote the objects. Our intention at this point is to show how and why Nietzsche 
agrees with Nagarjuna's conception. Again, this is not to say that both philosophers 
view language as a useless concept. For example, in Nagarjuna's case, Cheng 
eloquently states that, "the function o f language can be likened to a raft. A man 
intending to cross a river to get to the other bank, where i t is safe and secure, 
makes a raft. With its help he safely reaches the other shore. But however useful 
the raft may have been, he w i l l now leave i t aside and go his way without i t . So 
also language, including the term Dharma. is like the raft , to be discarded after 
Nirvana" ( H . Cheng, op. cit . , p24). 
Nietzsche's philosophy, like Nagarjuna's, has been linked to negativism and 
nihilism. What this chapter intends to stress is their purpose, which often seems 
overlooked, the attempt by both philosophers to achieve a "spiritual break through". 
As we have seen previously, Nagarjuna's journey into emptiness is a way of seeking 
the original inspiration of the Buddha. For Nietzsche, especially in his later works, 
there is an attempt to find a way beyond the nihilistic devaluation of existence. He 
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also questions the ontological Western traditions that his culture, and still to a great 
extent our present culture, rely upon so greatly to give us meaning, form, and 
structure. Nietzsche's endeavour is pitted against the traditional ideals that respond 
only to hidden fears and suffering. Because of this phenomenon, Nietzsche 
believed that our "entire edifice of culture" is not based on a true representation of 
existence. This creates havoc within the human state of being, and in light of this 
problem man should be searching for that "primal meaning", which remains in 
constant f lux and is ever changing. In comprehending our situation we must seek 
reassurance, and then assess our situation. In short, we crave for a "sub text" that 
can be interpreted as the "surface" text. To quote f rom W i l l to Power : 
"The hermit does not believe that a philosopher - supposing that a 
philosopher has always been first o f all a hermit - has even expressed his 
real and final opinions in books; does one not write books precisely to 
conceal what lies within us? - Indeed, he w i l l doubt whether a philosopher 
could have "final and real" opinions at all , whether behind each of his caves 
there does not and must not lie another, deeper cave -a stronger, more 
comprehensive world beyond the surface, an abyss behind every ground, 
beneath every "foundation". 
(F. Nietzsche, op. cit . , 289) 
Clearly, for Nietzsche, his philosopher mentioned above, who searches for 
what is real and valid, takes on a sort of Socratic form of redemption that depends 
on false belief, "the belief that we can discover the ultimate truth about things 
through rational inquiry" ( M . Clark, "Nietzsche a Postmodernist? . . . Nietzsche, De 
Man, and Postmodernism", in C. Koelb (Ed.), Nietzsche as Postmodernist. p77). 
Nietzsche's own philosophy, in this sense, stems largely f rom the acceptance of 
Schopenhauer's claim, "that the world accessible to us through sense experience and 
theory is mere appearance" ( M . Clark, Loc. cit . , p77). But, Nietzsche goes one 
step further when he suggests in " W i l l to Power" that: 
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"When one has grasped that the "subject" is not something that creates 
effects, but only a fiction, much follows. I t is only after the model of the 
subject that we have invented the reality o f things and projected them into 
the medley o f sensations. I f we no longer believe in the effective subject, 
then belief also disappears in effective things, in reciprocation, cause and 
effect between those phenomena that we call things. There also disappears, 
o f course, the world of effective atoms: the assumption of which always 
depended on the supposition that one needed subjects. A t last, the "thing-in-
itself" also disappears, because this is fundamentally the conception of a 
"subject-in-itself". But we have grasped that the subject is a fiction. The 
antithesis "thing-in-itself" and "appearance" is untenable; with that, 
however, the concept "appearance" also disappears" 
(F. Nietzsche, op. cit . , 552). 
In short, Nietzsche is denying the antithesis between appearance and reality. 
Nietzsche does not "abandon ship" at this point, only to accept this nihilistic 
dead end. He still owes much to Schopenhauer, as one who had helped bridge the 
gap between those who believe in what is "real" and those who believe that what is 
"real" is not what we see. Again Nietzsche states in W i l l to Power. "There are 
neither causes nor effects. Linguistically, we don't know how to rid ourselves of 
them" (F. Nietzsche, op. cit . , 551). So, we may say, through Nietzsche's 
understanding o f the world, that Socratic knowledge is illusory. This is so, 
according to Nietzsche, because it appears through the veil of time, space and 
causality. A common Derridian belief is that Nietzsche has demonstrated 
appropriately that all language is metaphorical. Nietzsche claimed latterly in his 
posthumous notes that "knowing" was nothing but the corroboration o f favourite 
metaphors. Indeed, knowing was an imitative concept, disguised as reality so well , 
that we no longer think i t to be imitative. He calls for something different, "to 
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penetrate the realm of truth", and to lead us to a more natural sense of what we are 
within this world. Like Nagarjuna and his deconstruction o f language, Nietzsche 
does not intend to lead us away f rom the metaphysical traps either, for as A . Schrift 
suggests : 
"The success o f the Nietzschean deconstruction w i l l not allow the 
philosopher to escape f rom within the nets of language, however; but 
facilitating such an escape was never his intention. Rather, by revealing the 
hope o f a literal designation and an adequate, natural relation between words 
and things to be unrealizable, Nietzsche directs himself toward the critical 
task o f demonstrating that philosophers do not know what they think they 
know". 
(A. Schrift, Nietzsche and the Question o f Interpretation, pi32) 
The intention o f this quotation is to show that i t was the effort of searching 
by Nietzsche (and as we shall see, by Nagarjuna as well) which is of great 
importance. This searching f rom amongst the nihilistic "rubble" gives new meaning 
to Nietzsche the philosopher; seeking a "break through" f rom nihilistic devaluations 
of existence. This philosophical method can be described as an attempt at a radical 
spiritual breakthrough which, i f accomplished, would drastically change the way we 
live within our tradition in the West. Yet, more important than making this 
breakthrough is the attempt in seeking change. This is what Nietzsche is asking us 
to achieve: an exercise o f mind and l iving, and acceptance to ponder over the 
"abyss" that i t leaves us to contemplate. As G. T. Martin states, Nietzsche's 
"deconstructive hermeneutic" creates an abyss at the very threshold of our existence 
in this world. I t is indeed, no time to fear the unknown, i t is a time to seek i t , and 
to make the leap into the "abyss". Nietzsche is asking his "overman" to seize hold 
of language, employing it to further his power, recognizing that language is only a 
tool and not a reflection of reality, whereas Nagarjuna abandoned his "raft" in order 
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to reach Nirvana. As we have seen f rom previous chapters, in order for man to 
evolve into the "Ubermensch" Nietzsche methodically disintegrates traditional 
values, including Christianity, morality and language. He then calls for us to 
overcome values o f the past, in order to reach a new path (an "unheard o f 
spiritualization). 
We catch glimpses o f his "new path" within Thus Spoke Zarathustra. and the 
symbolism of the "Dionysian", as man attempts to a f f i rm a new l i fe . Concepts such 
as the "Ubermensch" are created as well as " W i l l to Power" and "Eternal 
Recurrence". Yet these should not be interpreted as ontological truths, but rather as 
symbolic and metaphoric ideals. 
Like Nagarjuna, Nietzsche admits that "communication is necessary . . . i t 
must be experienced as adopted as recognizable, but the world of phenomena is the 
adopted world, which we feel to be real. The "reality" lies in the belief that here 
we are able to reckon and calculate . . . the antithesis of this phenomenal world is not 
"the true world" , but the formless informable world of the chaos of sensations -
another kind o f phenomenal world, a kind "unknowable" for us" (F. Nietzsche, op. 
cit . , 569). Both Nietzsche and Nagarjuna are keen to deny a contrast between a 
phenomenal world (of mere appearance) and a "real" world, and are quite adamant 
in believing and pursuing the notion that through language we w i l l never reach the 
ultimate truth to the meaning of the world. 
There is a strong comparison to be made when looking at the concept of 
"being" within Nietzsche's and Nagarjuna's philosophies. For Nietzsche, as with 
Heraclitus, our existence is a process that is continuously in f lux . According to 
Schutte, Nietzsche's denial o f being can be described in this manner. First, there is 
no reality, outside of the reality of the physical world. In short, the metaphysical 
world which we, as humans, create, has no claim to reality, and is a fiction. 
Second, i t is a fiction to understand the term "being" for a metaphysical reality that 
is superimposed upon time and becoming. Lastly, i t is a mistake to construe nouns 
(names) to refer to what we actually live in , the world as flux. This leads to the 
79 
creation o f a false stability, which is implied f rom the formal structure of language. 
As Schutte suggests, "the metaphysical world o f reality . . . dims the reality of the 
only world there actually is, the world of l i fe that is always coming into being and 
passing away" (O. Schutte, op. cit . , p40). 
I t is significant to note that with Nietzsche, as with Nagarjuna, "being" 
seems to signify the arrest of the world that is overflowing, that is non-dualistic. 
For Nagarjuna "being" arrests the notion of enlightenment, for Nietzsche "being" 
arrests the notion of l i fe as " W i l l to Power". Those who posit the notion of "being" 
are responsible for our division between reality and the world we live in . Nietzsche 
wants us to understand that "things" do not exist in this world, for everything is 
flux. This being so, "one gives names to things, one equates them with each other, 
or calls them "identical" to what they were in the past, but only because otherwise 
the survival mechanism would probably be impaired" (O. Schutte, op. cit., p44). 
So, we separate and give names to things, so that we can feel greater security within 
our frightening world. We disguise the abyss, so we shy away f rom it and create a 
stage on which we can falsely "play act" our existence. This constitutes a rupture 
of existential continuity, in terms of the dynamic unity of l i fe . 
Nietzsche's " w i l l to power" is, according to Schutte, a metaphor designed to 
stop the erosion that metaphysics gives to this continuity. This brings us to a most 
important stage in the study. I f we are to agree with Schutte that the " w i l l to 
power" notion cannot be treated as a scientific theory then we must look at 
Nietzsche's views on causality. 
Nietzsche denies the existence of causes (transcendentally) and therefore 
rejects models of reality such as the Kantian model, because of notions of duality 
within the world. Obviously a strong comparison can be made here, with the 
concept o f Advaya, the non-duality within the Madhyamaka religion. Similar to 
David Hume, Nietzsche understood the notions of cause and effect to be a probable 
mental projection conditioned by use (or habit). But, according to Schutte, 
Nietzsche goes one step further in suggesting that the "reason regularity is 
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interpreted as necessary is that human beings are very much afraid o f the unknown" 
(O. Schutte, op. cit. p52). One starts to search for a cause, because of this fear of 
the unknown. As Schutte states : 
"When confronted with something new in our experience, the dread of the 
new makes us want to associate the new event with some past experience 
rather than attempt to understand the new event on its own terms". 
(O. Schutte, Loc. cit . , p52) 
We establish, according to Nietzsche, a safe, straightforward framework of 
explanation in our lives. Of course, this is what he wants us to break out of, and to 
go back to our more primal ways, to the l i fe that we should be instinctively l iving. 
Within Nietzsche's philosophy, language and causality begin to crumble 
under the statement that there are no realities. G. T. Martin speaks of this as a new 
deconstructive hermeneutic, which opens up the "abyss" again, the actual core of 
existence. Martin further adds that: 
"his [Nietzsche's] writings, involves the struggle with this truth, and his 
attempt to overcome its nihilism in favour of a new unheard of vision not a 
denial of "becoming" by its logical antithesis; being" 
(G. T. Martin, op. cit . , p94) 
Examples f rom Nietzsche's work concerning this matter are the symbolic 
paradigms, such as Zarathustra, the Dionysian and the Artist, which we w i l l 
consider more thoroughly in Chapter Five's comparative discussion of Nietzsche 
and Zen Art . For now let us say that the artist, "reflect[s] complete and unreserved 
life-affirmation, affirmation not only of suffering, death, and becoming, but of the 
necessarily perspectival character of existence itself which constitutes the most 
dreadful insight" (F. Nietzsche, Ecco Homo I I , 2). As mentioned above, there is 
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also Nietzsche's "new relation to the world" which is highlighted by such ideas as 
"the overman", " w i l l to power" and "eternal recurrence". And lastly there is 
metaphor, such as Nietzsche's metaphor o f the Alchemist. This "spiritual alchemy" 
which, Mart in suggests, besets and gives flavour to Nietzsche's new relation to the 
world, which with the help o f nihilism, as a "bridge", has come upon us to pioneer 
and make way for i t . As Martin states, on the metaphor of the Alchemist: 
"[he] does not exchange but transfigures, creating new values out o f next to 
nothing. The holiness of being that once permeated and grounded 
phenomenal existence is lost in nihilistic devaluation, never to be restored. 
Our only hope lies in finding a new sanctity through a transvaluation of our 
relation to this groundless existence". 
(G. T. Mart in, op. cit . , p96) 
Noting the similarities of thought found in Nagarjuna and Nietzsche we are 
lead to compare Nagarjuna with another relevant Western philosopher, 
Wittgenstein. Probably the most important points that Ludwig Wittgenstein makes 
throughout his philosophical investigations is that a word is not necessarily the name 
of a thing, "and that philosophic problems arise when one abstracts a word f rom its 
context - that is, f rom the everyday workings of language - and tries to understand 
that word apart f rom its functional matrix" ( N . Katz, "Nagaijuna and Wittgenstein 
on Error", in N . Katz (Ed.), Buddhist and Western Philosophy. p306). 
Wittgenstein uses the word "time" to highlight his arguments. One 
may ask, "Quid est ergo tempus?", and find that i t is eventually a hard 
question to answer. The concept o f time, according to Wittgenstein, is a 
technique we learn for a variety o f purposes, that we all know and use 
everyday. Yet, we assume that the actual word "time" has a deeper 
significant meaning than what we know. Like the "King Milanda" story (see 
Chapter Two) where we learn that we have a naive understanding o f the 
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workings o f language, Wittgenstein also sees language as a fundamental 
problem within human existence. Katz suggests: 
"The parallel between the Buddhist notion of "convenient designation" and 
Wittgenstein's "everyday language" is clear. Both are saying that because a 
word may be used, we should not get carried away with philosophies about 
essences and the like" 
( N . Katz, op. cit. p311) 
The Buddha himself declared that "all grief, woe, lamentation and despair" could be 
traced to a naively understood grammar of " I " . 
The Mahayanists, as we have seen, try to escape f rom what Wittgenstein 
would call "naming inner-objects". This is the reason the Mahayana following 
moved away f rom prajna (wisdom) to prajnaparamita (wisdom which has gone 
beyond). To recap the views of the Mahayana for this comparison with 
Wittgenstein, i t is important to remember that in order to gain this perfect wisdom 
(prajnaparamita) i t involves the realization that the Dharmas (truths) themselves are 
objects implying an inner, unreachable self, "Just as much as the objects in the 
external world they were meant to do away with, but also that, as with 
Wittgenstein, there is no way of 'correctly' identifying and naming necessarily 
private Dharmas". (C.Gudmansen, Wittgenstein and Buddhism, p.34). Remember, 
the Theravadans believed that the Dharmas were true and that commonsense objects 
were logical fictions. "But the Mahayana now adds that those (Dharmas) are empty 
of self in the sense that each one is nothing in and by itself, and is therefore 
indistinguishable f rom any other Dharma and so ultimately non-existent" (C. 
Gudmunsen, Loc. ci t . , p34). This is the Mahayana way of telling the world that i t 
is a grave mistake to put the world into simple, "existent particulars". 
Indeed, Wittgenstein fits in well with the Madhyamaka notions on language. 
Of course, i t is significant to realize that however exhilarating and new 
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Wittgenstein's and Nietzsche's revelations on language are to Western thinkers we 
must keep them in perspective compared to the "time frame" of the East. Much of 
what Wittgenstein had to say about the theory of language was anticipated some 
1800 years before in India. 
In conclusion, when looking at Nietzsche's relationship with Asian thought, 
and specifically within the comparisons made in this chapter, we must understand 
that Nietzsche's deconstructive hermeneutic sets out to destroy the metaphysical 
foundations o f the modern Western world. This is why he compares so neatly to 
the Madhyamaka movement, and their dismantling of the metaphysical in their 
time. To observe this relationship more closely, G. T. Martin describes rather 
compendiously three forms of spiritual quest: 
(1) That there is a "religious intuition o f a 'sacred dimension' transcending the 
everyday world"; 
(2) There is a critical and intellectual deepening of the understanding to the 
point where a "transforming wisdom is awakened"; 
(3) And that there is participation in a set of symbols, myths, and metaphors, 
which point to the possibility of "redemption". 
(G. T. Martin, op. cit . , p99) 
Mart in suggests that Nietzsche fits the last two forms, and that Nagarjuna only the 
second one. This leads us to the conclusion o f our comparisons between Nagarjuna 
and Nietzsche's notions o f language. 
Nagarjuna is best known for his total lack of participation within any form 
of discourse that might carry ontological implications, while Nietzsche uses 
metaphor and symbolism to what, in Nagarjuna's perspective, would in all 
probability be considered a dangerous degree. Yet, Nietzsche's use of metaphor 
helps us conceive this "new relation" to the world. For example, his use of the 
artist metaphor as being "what is essential" is "perfection of existence . . . production 
84 
of perfection and plentidue", and that "essentially art is affirmation blessing, 
deification o f existence" (F. Nietzsche, W i l l to Power. 821). This shows us that 
there is human potential for some "spirit" to rise out of the rubble. Call this a 
philosophically, revolutionary spirit i f you w i l l , but certainly i t is an attempt, as 
such were Nagarjuna's writings, to transform "our mode of being-in-the-world". 
Finally, we find that Nietzsche is near to Nagarjuna's thinking that "there is 
a "non-duality" between human action, language, and grammar, on the one hand, 
and the world on the other" (G. T. Martin, op. cit . , p l08) . Similarly, both 
philosophers do not offer a "quick" solution to the worlds o f "being" and 
"nothingness", but such is the price for living within an ontological framework. I t 
would be unjust to say that both of these philosophers leave us stranded in eternal 
despair, certainly they do not, practicality in philosophy should not be perceived as 
nihilism. What nihilism has done for both Nagarjuna and Nietzsche is to "dam" the 
river o f traditional methods of thinking within their respective environments. 
Retrospectively, i t allows new "streams" to appear as possibilities for existence -
and this is a call for change, and not a call for negativism. 
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C H A P T E R F I V E 
"Poets of Our Lives" 
This final chapter o f the dissertation w i l l establish an important link between 
Nietzsche and Asian philosophy, as found in examples f rom Taoist and Zen 
Buddhist views o f art and nature, and w i l l discuss how close Nietzsche was to 
Eastern thought in this respect. The chapter w i l l examine the significance of 
comparing Nietzsche's view of art and the artist to that of the transition of Chinese 
Tao to Ch'an to Zen, in light of human progress toward being at one with nature. 
As fellow scholars of the philosopher realize, Nietzsche found art a most fascinating 
subject and a significant one in reaching his philosophical conclusions. Of course, 
one can always find passages within Nietzsche's works which question the relevance 
of art. "The contradictions and ambiguities of Nietzsche's judgement in matters o f 
philosophy, art, and science are a source of constant irritation to his interpreters" 
( M . Pasley (Ed.), Nietzsche: Imagery and Thought. p4). This point is well taken 
but should not hinder our study of the relationship and importance of art for 
Nietzsche. 
Zen Buddhism, on the whole, would not be the well known practice that i t is 
in the East, or a popular subject for those who seek "alternative" belief in the West, 
i f i t were not for it 's practices in the arts, such as: painting, calligraphy, flower 
arranging, gardening, archery, architecture, tool making, or "motorcycle 
maintenance". The notion of Zen Buddhism in Japan for example, "is most often 
cited as the source of ideas and expression in aesthetic practice and discourse" 
(D.E. Cooper (Ed.), A Companion to Aesthetics. p69). The notion of art is an idea 
that is interwoven within the culture of Zen Buddhism and Japan. For Nietzsche, 
art, and the artist as a metaphor, helps his search toward the Ubermensch ideal by 
using art as a tool to guide us to a more natural state of being. Zen too suggests 
that art, in a broader use of the word, is good practice in attaining enlightenment. 
This chapter intends to show how these two philosophies come to their conclusions, 
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hoping to extract more o f the "Eastern eye" f rom Nietzsche's uncanny resemblance 
to Asian thought. 
For the first part of the chapter, i t is important to outline the development of 
Zen Buddhism by discussing its evolution, excluding Nagarjuna's philosophy (see 
Chapter Four) which has already been covered. What we do want to discuss is 
Zen's history and development f rom the basic Mahayana principles and from 
Chinese Taoism, which eventually led to the Ch'an religion in China, only to 
become what we know as Zen in Japan. The significance o f Taoism for Nietzsche 
w i l l become quite clear as the chapter develops. The chapter w i l l also concentrate 
on Zen art and practice in regard to its use in Zen philosophy, and w i l l demonstrate 
why Zen is so keen on its use of art as a device leading to enlightenment. In 
conclusion, the chapter w i l l l ink Nietzsche to the questions o f nature, art and l iving. 
We w i l l discuss the attempts by both Nietzsche and Zen to employ art to 
challenge the sense of "reality" of existence, as most people conceive i t , and to 
come to an understanding o f their "alternative" roads. We w i l l come to understand 
why both traditions have repeatedly shown that some of their most important 
concepts are at times best understood and viewed under the guise of art and the 
artist, realistically, practically and metaphorically. This paper w i l l portray the idea 
of art in this significance, for i t must be noted that both the Zen ideal 
(enlightenment) and Nietzschean "positiveness" rely on art to show their respective 
routes to progress, although the use o f art has different connotations for such 
philosophy. 
I 
What is Zen and why is Zen art so significant to its philosophy? I t is 
d i f f icul t to explain the function of Zen for the spoken word is regarded to have a 
negative connotation. Indeed, this belief holds the key as to why Zen art is 
important to its followers: i t is speechless, and at times frustrating to those who 
would seek a fast and easy way to "the path". 
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Zen is foremost a discipline, a discipline that leads to non-thinking ("one 
knows i t by not knowing i t " (E. Herrigel, Zen in the Ar t of Archery. p l 7 ) . Zen 
involves the strict meditation methods, which are so common within the Eastern 
religions. Yet, "the Zen practice of meditation is not a mode of deliberate 
reflection, not thinking in the usual sense, but consists rather in an evacuation of the 
mind, a process through which alone we can fu l ly exercise our intuitive insight" 
( M . Anasaki, Buddhist Ar t . p50). Zen, through its evolution f rom Mahayanist and 
Taoist disciplines, takes on a new aspect to the idea that "our mind is Buddha" ("in 
the scriptures first produced in India the idea of "our mind is Buddha" was not 
promulgated. I t was not until the Chinese Zen (Ch'an) masters that this idea was 
fu l ly developed" (Dogen, op. cit . , p i7 ) ) . 
Zen's strict disciplinarian background derives f rom the notion that l i fe must 
be treated as a disease, and that we must return to a way of "not-thinking", that 
there is object and subject division (see Chapters Three and Four). Simply put, i f 
one asked what the tree outside my window is a Zen master may well reply ( i f at 
all) with something such as, "I t is there". Why this reply? The teacher wants to 
illuminate the student into thinking that everything can be confronted with one's 
own mind. To quote Suzuki, " I f I am asked, then what Zen teaches, I would 
answer, Zen teaches nothing. Whatever teachings there are in Zen, they came out 
o f one's own mind. We teach ourselves; Zen merely points the way" (D. T. 
Suzuki, Introduction to Zen Buddhism. p38). In other words, we must not seek 
enlightenment by way of questioning what things are, or indeed, why they are. 
Again Suzuki suggests that, "this state of inner consciousness, about which we 
cannot make any logical statement, must be realised before we can have any 
intelligent talk on Zen. Words are only an index to this state; through them we are 
enabled to get into its signification, but do not look to words for absolute guidance" 
(D. T. Suzuki, op. cit . , p58). In short, we must stop thinking in lateral terms of 
this world, for non-thinking increases our chances towards enlightenment. This 
concept lies within the understanding that we, as people, are nature itself, and that 
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there is no point in dividing things into object and subject. 
Within the subject o f Zen art this aspect o f "non-thinking" takes on a whole 
new meaning o f aesthetic experience in Japan, we w i l l explore this aspect in the 
second part o f this chapter. Before we give a brief history of Zen from its roots in 
India and China let us understand that Zen's main point to its students is the ability, 
"to see things properly and accept them the way they are - we must combine the 
'seer' and the 'seen' in one action. Our mind should be enlivened by the action of 
undivided mind" (Dogen, op. cit, p l l ) . Certainly this is not new to the Western 
tradition either, where there have been many thinkers (for example, Neo-Platonists, 
writers, poets, artists, etc.) who have experienced this "seeking" for the undivided, 
inter-connected and interwoven world (for example, "how can we tell the dancer 
f rom the dance" (W. B. Yeats, Among School Children)). Indeed this concept of 
the world should not only be seen as Eastern mysticism, but i t can be seen as an 
extension to Nagarjuna's philosophical discourse and as a brave attempt to 
understand the world, as a world which is in all of us. 
Buddhism, which was founded in India during the 6th Century B.C. , 
reached Japan f rom China and Korea some twelve hundred years later. Certainly i t 
is by no means an indigenous philosophy to any of these Far Eastern countries, yet 
when one thinks o f Buddhism in modem terms it is usually associated with the Far 
East. Indeed, Zen "was a sinicized form of Buddhism which came to Japan, for the 
Indian religion had been forced to adapt itself to Chinese conditions in order to find 
acceptance in that ancient civilization. Its ecclesiastical language had become 
Chinese, its temple architecture was in Chinese construction, and the religions art 
embraced Chinese styles" (J. Vollmer, G. Webb, Japanese Ar t , p l l ) . 
Zen, translated as contemplation, was first introduced into China by the 
Bodhi Dharma f rom India is 620 B.C. With its integration into a foreign land, i t 
was inevitable that the concept would take on the indigenous religions, and certainly 
the "marriage" between Buddhist and Taoist religions was effectively bom out of 
this amalgamation ("with the tranquil temper of Taoist quietism"), ( N . Tsuda, 
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Handbook of Japanese Ar t . p44). As Munsterberg advocates on the making of the 
Zen world: "Although Zen was not a Mahayana doctrine, Mahayana was a prelude 
to Zen's birth [see Chapters Three and Four], for i t was the Chinese genius working 
on the raw material of Indian thought which, with contributions f rom Confucian and 
Taoist sources produced, with Bodhidharma as midwife, the essentially Chinese 
school o f Ch'an or as the Japanese later called i t , Zen Buddhism" ( H . Musterberg, 
Zen and Oriental Ar t . p l 7 ) . This chapter highlights the Taoist background, not 
only for the reasons mentioned above, but also because the religion extended the 
appreciation that Buddhist sects have of nature, particularly when it comes to Zen. 
Wi th nature we also find art, and vice-versa within Zen, and this interwoven 
thinking is indeed relevant to that o f Nietzsche's views on the subject of art and 
nature. 
I am not trying to argue for the idea that Taoism and its principles brought 
nature to the forefront o f Zen philosophy, but we must believe that i t , indeed, 
assisted in developing Zen's obsession with nature. As M . Anesaki suggests : 
"Zen was a branch of Buddhism which laid special emphasis upon meditation. Its 
adherents believed that to them had been directly transmitted the spiritual 
illumination of Buddha, and they cultivated his method of meditation simply and 
purely, without a mixture of mysterious rituals and doctrinal analysis. They had, 
moreover, inherited the nature-mysticism of the Indian Buddhists which, together 
wi th the poetry of the Southern Chinese, became a source of inspiration for the 
artistic sense of the Japanese" ( M . Anasaki, op. cit . , pp48-49). So, before we look 
at Zen and art, let us first find it 's inspiration with the marriage o f Taoist thought. 
Taoist culture, like Zen, "was to overcome worldly troubles and find an 
everlasting repose in the calm enjoyment of nature" ( M . Anasaki, op. cit . , p55). 
So often in this thesis we come to understand that nature and being "one" with the 
world is an extremely important aspect both for Nietzsche and for Asian thinkers. 
Wi th Taoism this is certainly so, and because of this, Zen takes on even more of a 
need for nature than previous Buddhist sects. Let us look at Tao and Taoism. 
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Tao, the path or the way, is the leading idea in the Tao Te-Ching (the bible 
o f Taoism) and can be conceived in three senses in which this "way" can be 
understood. Tao can be described as the way of ultimate reality, a concept which 
mere words cannot describe. Secondly, Tao is the way of the universe, the driving 
power in all nature and Tao is the way man should order his l i fe , to gear himself in 
with the way the universe operates. Unlike the philosophy of Confucius, Lao Tzu, 
the founder o f Taoism, focused beyond man and into the wholeness o f nature itself 
These two religions were poles apart f rom each other, yet lived side by side within 
ancient Chinese culture. 
Taoism emerged in China as three different types o f power or "Te". First, 
Te (power o f the universe) can be reached by magic, which is popular Taoism for 
the masses. Second, Te takes on a more esoteric form, in the sense that i t is 
concemed with holding the society together by a mystical form of morality, which 
highlights the difference to Confucius' morality of mles and rituals. Through 
psychic practice, such as meditation and yoga, the idea was that by example, people 
who participated in these practices would become a benefit to society. The goal of 
Te was to develop the inner-man (as opposed to outer-man and "to arrive at this 
inwardness i t was necessary to reverse all self-seeking and to cultivate perfect 
cleanliness o f thought and body" ( H . Smith, op. cit . , p l87) ) . Last o f all Te is a 
philosophy in which : "the power of Tao is the power that enters a l i fe that has 
reflectively and intuitively geared itself in which the way of the universe" ( H . 
Smith, op. ci t . , p l89) . This last form of Te is what we want to develop in relation 
to Zen Buddhism and Nietzsche's artistic/nature model. 
Taoism's philosophical side is best described by its term W u Wei, or 
"creative quietude" ( H . Smith, Loc. cit . , p l89) . Man is seen as a combination 
between "supreme activity and supreme relaxation". W u Wei is "virtue approached 
f rom a direction diametrically opposite to that of Confucius. With Confucius' every 
effort was tumed to building up a complete pattem of ideal responses which might 
thereafter be consciously irritated" ( H . Smith, Loc. cit . , p l89) . With Taoism i t is 
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the opposite, due to W u Wei , for one wants to "f low spontaneously" with their 
behaviour and to live in a more natural manner with the world. As H . Smith 
suggests : 
"On the whole the modern Western attitude has been to regard nature as an 
antagonist, something to be squared o f f against, dominated, controlled, 
conquered. Taoism attitude towards nature tends to be the precise opposite 
to this" ( H . Smith, op. cit . , p l93) . 
Yet, this cannot be said of Nietzsche, as we shall see later in part three of 
this chapter. But to return to nature and Taoism we must also bridge the connection 
pertaining to art. The Taoist approach to nature has a deep significance for Chinese 
art, and therefore had great influence on Japanese art for Japan owes much to the 
Chinese Ch'an religion, which transformed into Zen. Taoist art, like Zen, is not 
some sort o f meretricious artistic statement boldly clashing with its environment, 
which may be seen at the Tate on any given day. Taoist art blends in with nature, 
just as man should blend into nature. To understand this concept let us take Taoist 
landscape painting as an example. As Smith proposes about landscape painting : 
"Man's part in that vastness is small, so we have to look closely for him in 
the painting i f we find him at al l . Usually he is climbing with his bundle, 
riding a buffalo, or poling a boat - Man with his journey to make, his 
burden to carry, his h i l l to climb, his glimpse of beauty through the parting 
mists. He is not as formidable as a mountain, he does not live as long as a 
pine; yet he too belongs in the scheme of things is surely as the birds and the 
clouds. And through him as through the rest of the world flows the rhythm 
movement o f Tao" ( H . Smith, op. cit . , p l94) . 
Everything blends into one, and i f one were to propose that something has a 
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character of its own, whether i t be in Tao or Zen, then we would be losing the 
meaning o f Tao and Taoism. For even in the concepts such as good and evil, these 
two familiar "opposites" that we had seen throughout the thesis, they too lost their 
absolute character and become one and the same thing, just as man is portrayed with 
nature in a Taoist landscape. 
As we tum to Zen again, with a greater understanding of Zen's 
metamorphosis f rom Chinese philosophy, one must be extremely careful not to label 
Zen as purely an extension f rom Indian Buddhism to Chinese philosophy to Zen. 
Zen stands alone and in some ways becomes contradictory to its being attune with 
nature, and being interwoven with nature, due to it 's strong individualistic 
overtones. There is a regal spirit in Zen, much like Nietzsche, that accepts and 
heralds the way back to nature, and yet at times this is done individually. One has 
to understand this pilgrimage back to nature on his own. Self enlightenment is of 
the upmost importance in Zen practice. As Suzuki states : "spiritually, directness 
o f expression, disregard o f form or conventionalism, and frequently an almost 
wanton delight in going astray f rom respectability" (D. T. Suzuki, Awakening of 
Zen, p57). Here we have a dilemma when speaking o f Zen as an individualistic 
religion. The paradoxical intonations derives f rom the notion that through personal 
experience in contemplation one can attain enlightenment, although we are all under 
the guise o f nature. Zen and Zen art undoubtedly wants to, "pervade human l i fe 
with a spirit of naturalism" ( M . Anasaki, op. cit . , p48), and in doing so, according 
to Anesaki, this meditation/contemplation results in this strong individualistic 
character o f its followers; yet at the same time there is an undying love for the 
tranquil beauty of nature. As Anesaki advocates : "This somewhat paradoxical 
combination o f individualism and transcendentalism resulted in an identification o f 
self with the world, a state to be realized only through insight into heart and spirit 
o f nature" ( M . Anasaki, op. cit . , p49). 
We should not take individualism as meaning some sort of motivated passion 
or enthusiasm, which must take place for enlightenment, nor should we think that 
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reason would be beneficial to Zen enlightenment. So, what is the essential element 
required for enlightenment? "The essential is intuition, which illuminates the mind 
like a flash in darkness, and pervades the whole air like moonlight" (M. Anasaki, 
Loc. cit., p49). As Suzuki states, "Zen wants to live from within. Not to be bound 
by rules, but to be creating one's own rules ..." (D. T. Suzuki, Introduction to Zen 
Buddhism. p64). But the Zen Buddhist sees his own rules reflecting within nature, 
living with nature, and blissfully in love with nature : 
"In his sight, the beauty and grandeur of a waterfall consist in its motion as a 
whole, - not in the movement of particular drops and bubbles; and it was 
this motion that the Zenist enjoyed as a symbol of the general, everlasting 
flow of nature" (M. Anasaki, op. cit., p52). 
Zen encourages a return to "naivety" for, at first, we are bom with a naive 
instinctual behaviour but we then stray from this behaviour in order to "seek" the 
"true" reality of this world. After Zen training and discipline in "non-thinking" we 
again return to the naivety, which is now seen as enlightenment, only when one 
realizes that seeking is not the way. In order to return to this naivety, we must 
strive for direct experience, and according to Zen this experience is not attainable 
by the human tongue (see Nagarjuna, Chapter Four). Surely this echoes concepts 
similar to Nietzsche's three phases of life from "Zarathustra" : the camel (beast of 
burden), the lion (destroyer), and the return to the child (a new kind of simplicity -
free to create things of the future). The difference of these two concepts, which we 
wil l see in greater detail in part three, lies within the problem of Nietzsche's 
attachment to something that is "of this world" (that is, our ontological world) and 
retrospectively important towards attaining a higher world in Nietzsche's terms. 
Yet, Zen also seeks a new way, a new viewpoint (Satori), which enables a 
person to obtain a "pure experience". But unlike our "rational" and conceptual 
Western world the idea of Zen is, "that the ultimate truth of life is to be intuitively 
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and not conceptually grasped, and that this intuitive apprehension is the foundation 
not only of philosophy but of all other cultural activities ..." (D. T. Suzuki, Zen 
and Japanese Culture. p219). In part two we will examine how this is so. 
n 
The important point to underline, when speaking of Zen and art, is that a 
"spiritual relationship" exists between Zen and Japanese art, a relationship which 
should be recognized as not only an aesthetic state, but also as having an important 
religious association between the two. To use Christian dialogue, art is "holy" to 
Zen (as Zen is "holy" to art) and the artist strives to create his art properly, in order 
to reach his goal for ultimate truth, by a sort of unification of artist to his art 
(samadhi). Art is used in a way so that we, as human beings, can obtain and 
acquire a phenomenological view with which to explain the mysteries of life, the 
secrets of nature and the realisation of Nirvana upon this earth. In order for us to 
do this we must, as Zen Buddhists, look upon, and react accordingly to our natural 
self. 
Nature itself is within all of us, according to the Zen Buddhists, we are 
nature and nature us, or to "employ Christian terminology, the good is to attain that 
peace which passes understanding, to lose oneself so as to find oneself, for as long 
as one thinks as the world thinks, one wil l never discover the wisdom of the self 
(H. Munsterberg, op. cit., pl08). In a sense, as with Nietzsche's use of art, it is a 
beginning to the "bridge" spanning toward enlightenment. In Zen painting we see 
Rinzai (the southern school of Zen which encourages sudden enlightenment by use 
of "Koans") influenced "sudden enlightenment"; in it's archery we see the strict 
spiritual discipline of Soto (the northern school of Zen that emphasises meditation, 
spiritual discipline and moral conduct). And yet, however different painting is from 
archery in the Western view, in Zen they both point to the same artistic ideal in the 
broader usage of the word. One could say that art allows the "sensual" to flower 
and bloom in both of these traditions : East/West, Zen/ Nietzsche. 
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Art, however, is very much embedded within the nucleus of the ultimate 
goal in Zen. Indeed, art takes on the philosophy of Zen, and never strays from it, 
as i f there is only one proper way to shoot an arrow, or stroke a canvas with an 
"untrammelled" brush of a shredded bamboo. As art is "marinated" within the Zen 
tradition, unable to be ingested on its own, it must have the flavour of Zen 
philosophy. So, we see, in Japanese, "gazen ichimi" translates to roughly meaning, 
"painting and Zen are one". In the world of Zen a separation would be looked upon 
as a misguidance. Let us take for example the Zen painters who, as Tsuda suggests, 
"were extremely fond of landscape paintings and of birds and flowers, separated 
from human figures. According to the ideal of Zen artists, beauty or the true life of 
things is always hidden rather than expressed outwardly. Realizing the limited 
power of any elaborate depiction in revealing the infinite life and power of nature, 
they tried not to display everything that may be seen, but rather to suggest the secret 
of infinity" (N. Tsuda, Handbook of Japanese Art. pl45-146). Hence, the work of 
the Zen artist was not a depiction of nature, but the expression of his emotion. Like 
a flash of lightning from out of a sky Zen Buddhist strove to capture a sudden 
moment of nature, in a most simple and pure way. 
The Zen artist must be prepared before he sets out to paint. Even today, "In 
Japan, the artist and the work have an antonymous value that takes precedence over 
reality. Those who hope to become painters, rather than select the vocation of 
painter as one of many outlets for expressing reality, first experience an awareness 
of some aptitude for art and then become artists, at least in embryo" (T. Terada, 
Japanese Art in World Perspective, pi4). For the painter of Zen art this awareness 
comes from experiencing the connotations of the absolute void of reality. The 
paintings, once the artist understands, reflect this true meaning of reality, and are 
called "Zenga" (pictorial expressions of the Zen experience). In this sense, it is the 
spirituality which is the true meaning that is behind the Zen experience. A Zen 
picture is a direct reflection on the profoundity of the artist. I f he is able to express 
the feeling of this voidness in reality, within his "Zenga" painting, then, and only 
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then, can the subject come to life for the observer. 
This sort of painting, completed within minutes, and keeping with the 
spontaneity and suddenness which Zen preaches seems a complete contrast, to say, 
the art of the Italian Renaissance whose artists strove to paint something worthy of 
God's love, ful l of detail depicting notions as to what was considered divine. The 
Holistic view of Zen art contrasts, "to major traditions in the West, society itself is 
a part of nature, a piece of a large and organic whole ... and a commitment and a 
process that brings forth the creator and audience close to the way" (D. E. Cooper, 
op. cit., p73). 
Surely, Buddhism too has its temples and shrines, and i f we were to examine 
Buddhism we would see an infatuation for symbolism as well. But this is Zen, and 
Zen's preoccupation is evident : one needs to move away from such ideas of 
symbolism, thinking in logical terms, etc. As mentioned previously, in Zen there is 
a moving away from separateness of self : Zen art takes on a sudden and immediate 
genre, and should not be understood in terms of Western ideas of aesthetics. 
Zen art must be used as an instrument in teaching. It teaches in a way that 
for the artist he becomes the object himself. To quote Herrigel: 
"The spider dances her web without knowing that there are flies who will get 
caught in it. The fly, dancing nonchalantly on a sunbeam, gets caught in the 
net without knowing what lies in store. But through both of them "It" 
dances, and inside and outside are united in this dance. So too, the archer 
hits the target without having aimed - more I cannot say" (E. Herrigel, op. 
cit. p80). 
As Herrigel eloquently suggests in this passage art engulfs both subject and object in 
the truest sense of Buddhist non-dualistic philosophy, artist and his art become all 
one of the same. 
Suzuki in discussing a painting of a hibiscus plant states that, "the secret is 
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to become the plant itself, but how can a human being turn himself into a plant? ... 
there must be in him something which corresponds to it in one way or another. I f 
so, he ought to be able to become the object he desires to paint. The discipline 
consists in studying the plant inwardly with his mind and thoroughly purified of its 
subjective, self-centred contents. This means to keep the mind in unison with the 
"emptiness" of sickness, whereby one stands against the object itself ... when the 
painter begins his work it is not he but the object itself that is working and it is then 
that the brush, as well as his arm and his fingers, become obedient servants to the 
spirit of the object" (D. T. Suzuki, Mysticism. Christian and Buddhist. p32). 
This state, that Suzuki describes, is a concerted effort of man beginning his 
"cross over the bridge". No matter how different the approach is to Nietzsche's 
efforts the association lies within the discontent of the present state of things in the 
illogical society that we live in. The way the Zen artists acquire their "truth" is by 
eluding to all the systematized and technical skills and in doing so come close to the 
life which is "all invigorating". For Nietzsche, as we will explore later, life as we 
know it still holds possibilities, still holds potential for something that is 
evolutionarily better. Mystically Zen is different from Nietzsche, for rationality 
does not exist in the slightest. How can the arrow hit a target without being aimed 
with calculations for distance, velocity and so on?, "the shot must fall, it must fall 
from the archer like snow from a bamboo leaf, before he even thinks it" (E. 
Herrigel, op. cit., p68). As we leave part two to consider Nietzsche's stance it is 
important for us to realize that Nietzsche's relationship to Zen lies with the insight 
and drive that the artist can achieve, in order to make his world more positive and 
less nihilistic. 
m 
Nietzsche's "fundamental falsity" indicates that he was occupied in the 
attempt to recover life, to recover "nature" from its deepest source. This attempt, 
like Zen, attacked institutions which were at large in their respective periods of 
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time. For Zen, the mind must be awakened to the "true mind", which was 
Buddha's original message according to Zen Buddhists, and not a seeking for 
Buddha, or a "setting up" of a Buddhahood. In many ways, Nietzsche's rejection 
of God as a "suprasenory value inimical to natural life" (M. Abe, op. cit., pl49), is 
the same sort of denial. As we know, Nietzsche's attack on Christianity was 
primarily an attack on Paul who had deprived man of his naturalness in his "setting 
up" of what we know as the Church because of his faith in Jesus. Our lives have 
been robbed, according to Nietzsche, of our instinctual naturalness by Christian 
morality. The attack was not aimed at Jesus whom Nietzsche admired, at least, for 
his attempt in trying to obtain a "true" way of life. As M . Abe suggests, 
"According to Nietzsche, the essence of life is the instinct for the development and 
preservation of life, the instinct toward the accumulation of energy, the instinct to 
power" (M. Abe, Zen and Oriental Thoueht. pl36). 
Although this may at first seem to stray from the path of Zen art and the 
Nietzschean concept of art it should be noted that a comparison exists between 
them, there is a certain lack of tension between the pursuit of enlightenment and the 
pursuit of the "Ubermensch" neither have commitment to any social moralities. In 
other words, morality in Zen is yet another label, another meaningless turn; just as 
depicted in the picture of a monk burning the Diamond Sutra, Nietzsche too wishes 
to destroy the New Testament, for the essence of life is his will to power. 
Art is a useful way of demonstrating this energy for Nietzsche, as is the 
artist and his aestheticism. According to Nehamas, "this aestheticism results from 
his effort to bring style into the centre of his own thought and to repeat once more 
what he took to be the great achievement of the Greeks and Romans. To make of 
the grand style no longer mere art but ... reality, truth, Ufe" (A. Nehamas, 
Nietzsche : Life as Literature. p39). Nietzsche saw the artist (as a metaphor) as the 
closest example of human being to actually be able to try to establish new 
adventurous ground. His use of words such as "freedom", "truth", "creative 
placing", "forming" lead to this conclusion, I have no doubt one has to create truth. 
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and not just discover it (see Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil (211) and Will to 
Power (552)). What Paul had done, according to Nietzsche, was not in any way 
adventurous,indeed it was detrimental to man's well being within nature. So, 
Nietzsche turns to concepts such as art and the artists, forging newer ground. 
Nehamas points out a most intriguing example: 
"Consider, for example, a radical innovation in painting or in literature: 
single point perspective or cubism, naturalism, or stream of consciousness. 
We often speak of these as "styles", and accordingly think of them as menus 
for depicting in novel ways what was there all along to be depicted. Yet 
such innovations do not allow us simply to represent a pre-existing world in 
new ways. At least as much, they produce new things to paint or write 
about; they create new aspects of reality to which we can now for the first 
time, be true" (A. Nehamas, op. cit., p59). 
This is precisely the point Nietzsche is trying to make: that man establishes 
himself as an innovator within the here and now. This notion conflicts with the 
fundamental concepts of Zen and Art. Zen philosophy feels that the artist is still 
trapped within the restrictions of technical and traditionalist views of what art 
should be. The problem with Zen's concept of art is that the artists works are not 
"precipitating" with life; he is not creating but rather imitating. One must 
understand this difference between Zen and Nietzsche, for the latter's "art" is the 
supreme manifestation of what we are : in short, "will to power". In this sense, art 
brings us close to nature, for nature is also "will to power". Hence, there is at once 
an analogy with, and a difference from, the Zen view of art. For even Nietzsche's 
exuberance for man to grasp hold of nature seems to stall. For Nietzsche, it seems 
that one cannot finally be 'one' with nature, since even the overman-artist must 
'falsify' how things are. The overman must impose "being" when (as we know of 
Nietzsche's philosophy and its "everflowing" nature) there is only becoming. In 
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short, man cannot achieve "being", but is certainly encouraged by Nietzsche to try. 
This is the importance of Nietzsche's view on Art and Nature. Zen, in the final 
analysis, does not attempt to try to achieve 'being' in this way. What way one may 
ask? The way that Nietzsche falsifies nature, and imposes a form to nature that it 
does not have. Nietzsche tries to grasp hold of nature, shaking it, throttling its 
neck, in order for it to conform to his "man", his "overman". Although Nietzsche 
realizes that this goes against his belief in an "everflowing world of existence"; 
Nietzsche understands the need for giving hope, form, and meaning, to our 
existential world. For the Zen artist; nature overflows, overgrows, and "is" to 
every extent "everything". Certainly, Zen js at "one with nature". 
To recapitulate, art is a tool for Zen, for Nietzsche it is a finding that there 
are great possibilities in the here and now. Nietzsche valued interpretations of the 
world, which are considered empty and deceptive constructs of the mind according 
to Buddhists. They hold value for Nietzsche for they preserve life through a 
disguised "will to power". Although we value the world falsely, it is still 
something to be affirmed. In Zen practice, and other Buddhist sects, one wants to 
rid everything to do with the "mind", which for Buddhists is all illusion and 
ignorance. Although his artist model is often written in a positive stance we must 
now ask ourselves whether art is Nietzsche's ultimate goal and achievement for 
obtaining passage to the other side of the "abyss". 
In the early "Birth of Tragedy" and certainly from "Zarathustra" and beyond 
art is mostly a positive function, for it opposes any "devitalising knowledge". "Art 
and nothing but art! Art is the great enabler of life, the great temptress to life, the 
great stimulant of life" (F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 682). And yet, for 
Nietzsche the downfall of art, is acting as a "hand maid" to religions, or 
philosophers. More to the point of this subject, Nietzsche's derogatory remarks 
about art at times stem partly from his attack on the Schopenhauerian stance that art 
can be used as vehicle, i f you wi l l , on the road to "Nirvana". As usual, this attack 
is spurred on by Nietzsche's disgust with any organized religion. We must 
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remember that Nietzsche is stringently trying to aim for a kind of detachment from 
all ideals and concepts. And yet, i f Nietzsche had been familiar with Zen tradition 
he certainly would see the likeness to his own works on this subject, even though 
the philosophies seem to separate in their final conclusions. Nietzsche disassociated 
himself from Schopenhauer on the subject of art and aesthetics because, "by 
bestowing the highest possible value on art, namely independence, [Nietzsche] finds 
himself in the peculiar position of exposing it to every conceivable attack, since 
neither priest, philosopher, nor politician can see it serving his purposes" (M. 
Pasley, op. cit., pl8). 
Again, one cannot help but wonder that i f Nietzsche had been exposed to the 
Zen concept of art would he have seen it in a positive light, or would he have seen 
Zen art as a corrupted assistant to religious activity? Yet, as we have seen, Zen is 
so unreligious at times in comparison to Western religious beliefs. Zen's denial of 
seeking Buddha, it's denial of seeking ideals and concepts of "samsara" seem so 
close to Nietzsche's spirit and energy. Nevertheless, Zen, and all the other 
Buddhist sects, would have seemed quite grim and nihilistic to Nietzsche. 
Certainly, because of this, Nietzsche distanced himself from Schopenhauer. 
Nietzsche wanted to find the solution to Schopenhauer's "nauseating" view 
of life, at first through a rebirth of Greek tragedy; a retreat back to the "intelligent, 
sensitive and cognizant" world of the ancient Greeks. Without Schopenhauer's 
previous influence (the belief of art having the remarkable power to transport man 
from out of our ordinary and everyday selves) Nietzsche's direction would have 
been different. As early as the Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche acknowledges that the 
significance of art is wasted i f one does not realize that there is a conscious 
changing experience, a transformation analogous to that occurring in the artist's 
creation. In a sense, the artist's psychological identity is transfigured. As the title 
of the book states, Nietzsche was crying out for a "rebirth" of tragedy so that 
science would inevitably "shipwreck" itself. The hope (or hero) of the period of the 
book was Wagner, who later was to be chastised by Nietzsche. Before we look at 
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Nietzsche's latter and broader view of art, let us examine his Apollonian and 
Dionysian dualities. 
Nietzsche's use of the conceptual opposites, the "Apollonian" and 
"Dionysian", highlights the two conditions in which "art appears in man as a force 
of nature" (F. Nietzsche, Wil l to Power. 799). The Dionysian being "an urge to 
unity, a reaching out beyond personality, the everyday, society, reality, across the 
abyss of transitoriness ... and the Apollonian meaning the urge to perfect self-
sufficiency, to the typical individual" (F. Nietzsche, op. cit., 1050). The notion of 
"wil l to power" is an outgrowth of the duality between the Apollonian and 
Dionysian "art impulses of nature". 
The "Ubermensch" is life raised to the level of art, and the Dionysian artist 
exemplifies the work of art as being part of himself, much as the Zen artist does in 
order to paint in the Zen way. Indeed, Schacht states in considering the artist in the 
Birth of Tragedy that, "the Dionysian artist has identified himself with primal unity, 
in all its 'pain and contradiction' and also its exhaustible and indestructible vitality -
and, thus released. From his individual wil l ; he gives symbolic expression to the 
nature of the fundamental reality with which he identifies" (R. Schacht, op. cit., 
p491). Nietzsche is calling to attention not so much a "transformation of our 
consciousness along line rendering us oblivious to our individual existence" (R. 
Schacht, op. cit., p502) much like a Buddhist ideal would render, but more so a 
"Verklarung", a transfiguration of the character of our consciousness whilst still 
giving value to such existence. This creates a remarkably different conclusion to 
Zen's usage of art, as mentioned before, the escaping from the "conscious" world. 
Nietzsche claims that art enables man to view life as worth living, through his 
"Verklarung", this transfiguration. 
Following his Dionysian/Apollonian dualities, as described in the Birth of 
Tragedy. Nietzsche "blossomed out" to see art as "the great stimulus to life" (F. 
Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols. IV, 24) the enhancer of life. As we can see from 
the above, Nietzsche's point about art is not only significant for aesthetic discourse. 
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but that it is also a vehicle enabling us to understand life more clearly, as i f the two 
are intertwined, as they are in Zen practice. For Nietzsche, art is a way beyond 
nihilism; "a new respect for ourselves and estimation of life, 'redeeming existence' 
in the aftermath of the collapse of old illusions" (R. Schacht, op. cit., p528). As 
Schacht emphasises in Nietzsche his artistic model serves the purpose in expressing 
the fundamental nature of life. " "Will to Power" (which is life to Nietzsche) is 
properly understood only i f it is conceived as a disposition to effect such creativity 
transformative overcoming, in nature, in human life generally, and art alike" (R. 
Schacht, op. cit., p482). This view is what Nietzschean scholars call Nietzsche's 
"Grand Style" in art (see Twilight of the Idols. IX : 11). "The power which no 
longer needs any proof - which spurns pleasing, which does not answer lightly, 
which feels no witness near, which lives oblivious of all opposition to it . . . " (F. 
Nietzsche, op. cit., 11). 
"Art as the wil l to overcome becoming" finds its highest format within this 
grand style. Who would meet this standard? We can only wonder, for even 
Nietzsche realized that the artist, and his art, fall short most of the time. So, who is 
Nietzsche's prototypical user of art? Certainly, it must be someone who is adept at 
using the greatest possible range of perspectives, someone who is free to roam from 
"dogma and doctrine", and someone who is grappling with their inner 
contradictions, and is obedient to his task. Like the Zen masters, Nietzsche too is 
looking for men of substance, those who pursue the truth, not for themselves, but 
for the world. Nietzsche depended upon his artistic models for understanding the 
world, and made them swear, "that there should be obedience ... given that, 
something always develops, and has developed, for whose sake it is worthwhile to 
live on earth, for example, virtue, art, music, dance ... " (F. Nietzsche, Beyond 
Good and Evil. 188). 
This, again, is all well and good but still the answer is left open as to who is 
the ideal, living model who has these attributes. Perhaps it is Goethe; as Nietzsche 
describes as someone who : 
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"return[s] to nature ... he did not sever himself from life, he placed himself 
within it; nothing could discourage him and he took as much as possible 
upon himself, above himself, within himself. What he aspired to was 
totality: he strove against the separation of reason, sensuality, feeling, will 
... he disciplined himself to a whole, he created himself..." 
(F. Nietzsche, Twillight of the Idols. 
"Expeditions of an untimely man", 49). 
Nehamas comes up with another possible answer, but only after first 
admitting that although "Nietzsche does not describe his ideal character" (A. 
Nehamas, op. cit., p230) he still manages to offer a conception of what he would be 
like. He further adds that, "Nietzsche's texts therefore do not describe, but in 
exquisitely elaborate detail, exemplify the perfect instance of his ideal character. 
And this character is none other than the character these very texts constitute : 
Nietzsche himself (A. Nehamas, op. cit., p233). True this may be, but 
Nietzsche's intentions surely were not for the purpose of creating an ideal image of 
himself. Nehamas further explains that because the will to power is considered the 
"Life Force" and the drive in man's life, Nietzsche shows his "most insistent 
ambition" to the world, and therefore may be seen as the "Artist^ Extrodinaire". 
To conclude, for Zen art is a tool toward Nirvana, a training method that is 
indeed life denying, in the Western sense, but it is not itself the goal. As suggested 
by Herrigel, the master denies that the bow and arrow is the goal itself, it is "only 
the way to a goal ... [it] only helps for the last decisive leap" (E. Herrigel, op. cit., 
p i8) . So too, Nietzsche grapples with art as being the end to all notions of attaining 
the "Ubermensch" ideal. As we have discussed, in this chapter and previous ones, 
with most Nietzschean concepts contradictions appear. Nietzsche's style is to 
contradict and to examine all sides of an argument, whilst destroying most "facts" 
which get in his way. For the artist model, his contradictions lie in the notion that 
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art and artists may be merely an "intermediary species" to the Ubermensch model, 
insisting in the Wil l to Power that they "fix an image of that which ought to be and 
so are still relatively lacking in wil l and strength of the sort necessary to be able to 
'endure' to live in a meaningless world because one organises a small portion of it 
ourself" (F. Nietzsche, Wil l to Power. 585). 
Nietzsche also sees that the artist possibly may be "easing" his burden and 
"dissatisfaction with reality". Nevertheless, Nietzsche sees the artist as, at the very 
least, a better example than "men of knowledge" for productivity and the potential 
to actually alter the "construction of the bridge" between man (beast) and overman, 
and that "it can be taken as paradigmatic in exhibiting the nature of the crossing, 
and in indicating what lies on the other side" (R. Schacht, op. cit., p524). One 
could say that this statement could be true of Zen and art as well. Yet, it would be 
false to assume that in Zen and in Buddhism there is another side, to them aU 
existence is meaningless. 
For Nietzsche, art also is a symbol for a way beyond nihilism, "a new 
respect for ourselves and estimation of life, redeeming existence in the aftermath of 
the collapse of old illusions" (R. Schacht, op. cit., p529). For Zen and Nietzsche 
alike, art is a part of nature, "a piece of a large and organic whole" (D. E. Cooper 
(Ed.), Loc. cit., p73). Nietzsche shares this traditionally Eastern view of life. He 
asks for a well rounded individual, one who is to grasp hold of the previous child-
like qualities, stripping away the beast of burden mentality. Zen, also, trains its 
disciples to "grasp", to obtain the "way", in such a way that is unrecognizable to 
man without proper training, and is unspeakable in our terms, and in our language. 
Nietzsche asks us to become "poets of our lives", to take note of what the artist 
spirit is, and somehow to conceptualize the spirit within ourselves, in our everyday 
lives. To quote Nietzsche : 
"We should learn from artists while being wiser than they are in other 
matters. For with them this subtle power [of arranging, of making things 
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beautiful] usually comes to an end where art ends and life begins; but we 
want to be poets of our life - first of all in the smallest, most everyday 
matters" rOay Science. 299). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The principle ideas discussed in this thesis are important in revealing the 
parallels and patterns, contrasts and contradictions of Nietzschean and Asian 
philosophy. From this study we have both enhanced our understanding of 
Nietzsche, and have gained insight into the vast differences between the 
philosophical thought and cultural expectations of East and West. In gaining an 
understanding of our place in the world we must attempt to comprehend even 
seemingly opposing opinions. For Nietzsche, in his effort to break out of the 
traditional Western mould, such an effort was a necessity. 
This is not to say that Nietzsche (like Schopenhauer) pursued Asian thought 
in the belief that it would be the salvation of man's existence. Nietzsche's goal was 
to free man from the bondage of Western social and philosophical traditions. To 
allow him to grasp his "will to power", be it physical, social or political; for 
Nietzsche all life derives from "will to power". Nietzsche demanded that we should 
denounce our mediocre existence among "the herd", and strive for a "spiritual 
growth", which offers a freedom reaching beyond "good and evil". In reaching his 
conclusions, Nietzsche explores and "borrows" concepts from many beliefs and 
philosophical disciplines; Asian thought is but one of the many concepts that 
Nietzsche uses to highlight his personal style of deconstructive philosophy. Yet, 
this is not to say that Asian philosophy and thought was merely a concept which 
could have been metaphorically interchangeable with anything. 
Asian philosophy, as we have seen, has many parallels with Nietzschean 
concepts, and is extremely important to the study of his philosophy. Nietzsche's 
aristocratic concept of power, domination, and mastery over the herd, compares 
closely to the Hindu caste system, which he used extensively as an analogous 
system with which to strengthen his viewpoint. Throughout this thesis we see 
Nietzsche's main concepts highlighted by some form of Asian religion, thought or 
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philosophy. The nihilism and asceticism found within Eastern religions was used by 
Nietzsche (through the influence of Schopenhauer) as tools for purging concepts 
such as morality, represented by "good and evil", in order to again say "yes" to the 
world with which one can live instinctively. As Heine suggests (see Chapter Two) 
"Although Buddhism and Nietzsche travel comparable paths of negativism and 
affirmation, traditional Buddhism assumedly does not conclude with a yes" (S. 
Heine, op. cit., p259). Nietzsche is often seen within this thesis as having a more 
"positive" stance than the Asian religions and philosophies to which his concepts 
have been compared. This is due to the idea that Nietzsche believed in the 
positiveness of the Ubermensch, as an ideal that can satisfy us, who live in the 
existential here and now. 
When one compares Nietzsche's idea of the self to that of the Buddhist 
notion of the non-self many avenues for comparison are opened up. It is evident 
that both philosophies have certain similarities on how they view the nature of the 
thinking mind. In our study of the nature of the self within the two philosophies 
(Chapter Three) we compared the views of East and West regarding mind and body. 
We found that Nietzsche's views do not entirely fit in with the notion of the non-
self (or I-less-ness) of the Buddhists, for he retains a certain individuality of the 
self, and is not as eager to identify the concept of the non-self to his more positive 
view that man can create something of himself individually, through a "will to 
power". Although this comparison of the "selfs" open up substantial ideas of non-
duality in the world, cause and effect, etc., and we find that Nietzsche has much to 
applaud in the nature of "selflessness", he inevitably still clings to his notion of 
"wil l to power", and this separates his thoughts from the Buddhist "I-less-ness". 
We speak of non-duality, and we think of Nagarjuna and the Madhyamaka 
movement. So too when we think of language, we think of the Madhyamakas, and 
their denouncing of language, as an important step toward understanding the 
"Buddha-way". Both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein to a great extent compare 
significantly with the Madhyamakas in the concept of non-duality. The reason why 
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there is a significant comparison between Nietzsche and Nagarjuna (Chapter Four) 
was that his "deconstructive hermeneutic" sets out to destroy the metaphysical 
foundations of the modern world, much as Nagarjuna did in his attack on the 
Theravadan world of Buddhism. Finally, Nietzsche is linked with Zen, nature and 
Taoism in his use of art, as a tool with which to reach the Ubermensch goal, much 
as the Zen Buddhists employed art as a means for reaching Nirvana. 
For Nietzsche art is the symbol for a way beyond nihilism, as it is 
worthwhile and positive in the sense that it creates new things from and of this 
world, as we know it. With Zen, art is used purely as a tool and nothing else, for 
the world and its objects are impermanent ("no-thing") according to Zen Buddhists. 
Yet Nietzsche shares a traditionally Eastern outlook of life when he asks for the 
"nature like" individual, or one who is attuned to "true nature", to grasp his 
instinctual qualities, and to strip away the "beast of burden" mentality of the 
Christians. Nietzsche asks us to become "poets of our lives", for our sake and for 
mankind's sake. 
This remains the principle difference between Nietzsche and the East, this 
dedication that Nietzsche has to this world. Nietzsche wants to exist in the world, 
and Eastern thought, although responsible to the world and one with nature, does 
not see this world as the being an end to all. It is merely something that one must 
break out of in order to be enlightened. Nietzsche's "enlightenment" is the "will to 
power", to be found within all of us, a power we must seek and use, i f we are to 
become the species we were meant to be. 
Finally, we must conclude that Nietzsche was no expert in the subject of 
Eastern thought, but rather one who borrows concepts of the East. This thesis 
never intended to show Nietzsche as someone who knew a great deal of Eastern and 
Asian philosophy, although many readers are led to believe that he did due to his 
many references to the subject within his works. Rather our intention was to show 
the importance of comparison, between the philosophies, as a means to 
understanding the similarities and differences between Eastern and Western thought, 
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the outlook on life within their respective cultures, and the often surprising parallels 
between Nietzsche's concepts, and those of the East. Again, it is not what 
Nietzsche knew about Asian philosophy that is important, it is what we learn from 
the comparisons, which is of the upmost significance within this study. 
I l l 
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